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INTRODUCTION
While recent positive developments in the interpretation of the
Refugee Convention 1951' (the Convention) continue to ensure its con-
temporary relevance,' significant divergence persists both within and
* B.Comm. (Hons.), LL.B 1996, University of New South Wales; LL.M. 2001, Univer-
sity of Michigan; S.J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan. I would like to thank the
participants in the Second Colloquium on Challenges in International Refugee Law, held at
the University of Michigan Law School in March 2001, for their challenging and thoughtful
discussion of the issues with which this paper is concerned. I am particularly grateful for the
contributions of Rodger Haines, James Hathaway, and Barbara Miltner. I would also like to
acknowledge the generous funding of the Skye International Foundation Trust, which sup-
ported my LL.M studies at the University of Michigan Law School, during which most of the
research for this paper was undertaken. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the
editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law for their painstaking work.
1. United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention].
2. See R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L. (1999)
(appeal taken from C.A.) for an example of a recent case extending the application of the
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between contracting state parties in relation to some key elements of the
definition of "refugee" and many states continue to devise restrictive
interpretive techniques to inhibit the potential application of the Conven-
tion.' One of the elements of the definition which does not yet enjoy
uniform interpretation among states, and which is increasingly identified
by state parties as a source of constricting the potential application of the
Convention, is the nexus clause; that is the requirement that a person's
well-founded fear of being persecuted be "for reasons of" one of the five
enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion.4
It is well accepted that this clause denotes a causal link between the
applicant's well-founded fear of being persecuted and a Convention
ground However, the analysis of the common law jurisprudence 6 under-
taken in this Article reveals that there is little consensus as to the
appropriate test to be applied in interpreting this aspect of the definition,
and that there is pervasive confusion surrounding causation in the refu-
gee context. Today, many different approaches to causation exist in
Convention to situations involving violence against women in Pakistan. These and other recent
developments are discussed by Rodger Haines in Gender-Related Persecution, a background
paper commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) for an
expert roundtable discussion on gender-related persecution as part of the Global Consultations
on International Protection in the context of the 50th anniversary of the Convention.
Rodger Haines, Gender-Related Persecution 2, at http://www.unhcr.chlcgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/
opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&page=PROTECT&id=3b93912e4 (noting that in the past
decade "the analysis and understanding of sex and gender in the refugee context has advanced
substantially in the case law, in state practice and in academic writing") (last visited Feb. 21,
2002).
3. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Research Paper on Non-State Agents
of Persecution (Nov. 1998), available at http://www.ecre.org/research/nsagents.doc (last modi-
fied autumn 2000) (addressing the key issue of whether a person falls within the protection of
the Convention when he or she fears persecution by non-state agents).
4. See Convention, supra note 1, art. I A, at 152 ("For the purpose of the present Con-
vention, the term 'refugee' shall apply to any person who... "). See also id. art. 1A(2).
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country.
Id. (emphasis added). See also United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan.
31, 1967, art. 1(2), 19 U.T.S. 6223, 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (removing the phrase "As a result
of events occurring before I January 1951 ") [hereinafter Protocol].
5. See, e.g., Gafoor v. INS, 231 F3d 645, 653 (9th Cir. 2000); Chen Shi Hai v. Minister
for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 201 C.L.R. 293, 302 (Austl.) (per Gleeson,
C.J., Gaudron, Gummow & Hayne, JJ.); Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic
Affairs, (1997) 190 C.L.R. 225, 240 (Austl.) (per Dawson, J.); Canada v. Ward, [1993] S.C.R.
689, 712; Exparte Shah, 2 A.C. at 646 (per Steyn, L.J.); id. at 653 (per Hoffmann, L.J.).
6. Note that the analysis in this Article is based on the interpretation of the Convention
by common law courts.
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refugee law, both between and within jurisdictions, with standards rang-
ing from an "effective sole cause" test and the "but for" and other
common law tests, to a more liberal test of "contributing cause." More-
over, the analysis undertaken in this Article suggests that there is a
tendency in some jurisdictions toward an overly restrictive understanding
of the requirements of the clause and an inappropriate reliance on stan-
dards of causation developed in inapposite areas of domestic law in
informing relevant standards in the refugee context. There is no doubt
that courts are increasingly concerned with the meaning and method of
analysis of the causation element in the refugee definition7 and that the
issue is beginning to attract the attention of legislators, who recognize
the potential for restricting the scope of the Convention by formulating a
stringent causation test.'
The aim of this Article is to explore current approaches to
identifying and applying the causation test inherent in the "for reasons
of" clause and to attempt to devise a sui generis test appropriate to the
unique aims and objects of the Convention. Part I begins by reviewing
both the principles governing the causation analysis and their methods of
application in different jurisdictions. Part II then proceeds to review the
considerations that might inform the development of a causation
standard in refugee law, including guidance that might be obtained from
other areas of law, against the background of the need for a context-
specific interpretation. Finally, Part III synthesizes the insights
developed in Parts I and II in order to formulate a standard that is
consistent with the humanitarian and protective aims of the Convention.
I. CAUSATION STANDARDS IN REFUGEE LAW
Whilst the definition of a "refugee" and the consequences of
recognition as such are set out in the Convention, implementation of the
provisions of the Convention is left to state parties through domestic
legislation and domestic adjudication by administrative tribunals and
appellate and superior courts. Since there is no international body to
which refugee applicants can submit communications regarding the
7. See infra notes 13-99 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that the issue of
"causation" is frequently defined as a specific element in the determination process and in
many cases the courts denote the separateness of the issue by inserting a subheading in a
judgment entitled "causation." See, e.g., Kozulin v. INS, 218 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000)
(containing subheading entitled "Causation of Attack"); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1490
(9th Cir. 1997) (containing subheading entitled "(c) Causation---"On account of").
8. See infra notes 67-70, 84-88 and accompanying text.
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interpretation and implementation of the Convention, 9 differences in
interpretation between state parties develop and persist unresolved by
any overarching supervisory body. It is thus not surprising that different
states take different approaches to a number of aspects of the refugee
definition, including the meaning and application of the "for reasons of"
clause. However, there is cause for concern when these different
approaches result in inconsistent determinations for refugee applicants,
and affect the chances of success for applicants in similar circumstances
according to the jurisdiction in which they claim protection.
This Article begins by attempting to categorize existing jurispru-
dence in five common law countries' ° according to the different tests
currently adopted in assessing whether the nexus clause is satisfied. As
the analysis will reveal, there is a wide array of approaches in operation.
However, much of the nexus analysis in the case law suffers from a lack
of clarity which makes categorization difficult and prone to overlapping.
In particular, there is frequent confusion or conflation of the ele-
ments of causation and intent as elements of the nexus analysis, which
can make it difficult and somewhat artificial in many cases to isolate the
causation standard as an issue of discussion. As mentioned above, it is
well recognized that the nexus clause denotes a causal link. Curiously
however, while it is recognized that causation does not necessarily in-
volve any element of intent in other areas of the law," in the refugee
context courts frequently introduce it unselfconsciously into the equation
as though it were an inevitable aspect of a causal determination.'2 That is,
the causal link is often held not to be established unless the applicant is
able to establish that the (past or future) persecutor intends to inflict se-
9. See Convention, supra note I, art. 38, at 178 ("Any dispute between parties to this
Convention ... shall be referred to the International Court of Justice."). However, Article 38
has never been invoked and in any case does not permit individual petitions. This is in contrast
to the position in relation to other international human rights treaties such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000) for a discussion of the different
models of complaint procedures provided for in other human rights treaties.
10. The jurisdictions considered for this Article are the United States, Canada, United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.
II. As Lord Salmon cogently explained, "giving the word 'cause' its ordinary and natural
meaning, anyone may cause something to happen intentionally or negligently or inadvertently
without negligence and without intention." See Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward, 1972 A.C. 824,
847 (appeal taken from Q.B.). See also McCann v. Switz. Ins. Austl. Ltd., (2000) 176 A.L.R.
711,716 (Austl.) (per Gleeson, C.J.) (where turning to equity, in the field of breach of fiduci-
ary duty, even in cases involving fraud on the part of the fiduciary, "the liability of a solicitor
to a client brought about by a dishonest or fraudulent act will frequently arise in circumstances
where the solicitor did not intend that there should be loss to the client, and where there were
additional causes of the loss").
12. For a detailed explanation of this phenomenon in United States law, see Shayna
Cook, Repairing the Legacy of Elias-Zacharias, 23 MICH. J. OF INT'L. L. 223 (2002).
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rious harm because of the applicant's race, political opinion, or other
protected status. This leap from causation to intention is seldom identi-
fied or justified.
The confusion can be explained in part by an underlying and rarely
articulated difference in the function which different courts perceive the
"for reasons of" clause as possessing. That is, although it is seldom ac-
knowledged explicitly, the application of a causal analysis frequently
produces different outcomes in similar cases according to whether the
"for reasons of" clause is perceived as pertaining to the persecutor's in-
tent, the intent of the state that withholds protection, or the reason for the
applicant's well-founded fear of being persecuted.
Thus, while this Article is primarily concerned with analyzing exist-
ing approaches to the causation standard in refugee adjudication and
moving toward the formulation of an appropriate standard consistent
with the purpose of international refugee law, the discussion is under-
taken with sensitivity to the underlying complexity produced by differing
visions (whether explicit or not) of the function of the causal analysis in
the refugee definition.
A. Sole Cause
The most restrictive method of interpreting the nexus clause would
be to require that the protected ground constitute the sole cause or reason
for the well-founded fear of being persecuted. Although such a test was
initially adopted by lower courts in various jurisdictions, appellate courts
have frequently rejected this approach on the basis that the "plain mean-
ing" of the phrase "for reasons of " "does not mean persecution solely on
account of" the protected grounds, 3 and that to read a sole cause test
into the definition "would render the Convention protection largely
ineffectual."' 4 For example, a sole cause test could not accommodate
situations involving causes that are inextricably related to one another,
nor would it accommodate a combination of partial causes. As a justice
of the Australian Federal Court has explained:
To require that a feared persecution arises solely for a Conven-
tion reason would be to narrow the scope of the protection
artificially. It would be an inadequate response to the possible
varieties of and excuses for the oppression of target groups
within a repressive society.'5
13. Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1029 (2d Cir. 1994).
14. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Abdi, (1999) 162 A.L.R. 105, 112
(Austl.) (per O'Connor, Tamberlin & Mansfield, JJ.).
15. Jahazi v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, (1995) 61 F.C.R. 293, 299
(Austi.) (per French, J.).
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Lower courts and tribunals'6 and appellate and superior courts in
other jurisdictions'7 have drawn similar conclusions.
Notwithstanding the very important rejection of a sole cause test in
principle, an analysis of the application of abstract principle to individual
determinations reveals that in practice courts frequently apply an
effective sole cause test by rejecting Convention-related explanations for
persecution (despite evidence to the contrary) and hypothesizing about
alternative non-Convention grounds that can exclusively account for the
fear of persecution. In other words, courts frequently proceed on the
apparent assumption that there is one sole explanation or reason for a
well-founded fear of being persecuted, and therefore the existence of a
non-Convention ground as a potential explanation for the fear of being
persecuted negates a Convention-related explanation. Such an approach
involves an artificial analysis whereby a false dichotomy is drawn
between non-Convention grounds and Convention-related explanations
or factors.
For example, in a recent application for asylum by a woman from El
Salvador who had fled to the United States following "beatings, threats
and harassment" suffered at the hands of FMLN guerillas, including her
common law husband, following her refusal to join the guerillas, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the Board of
Immigration Appeal's (BIA) dismissal of her claim. The court held that,
"the BIA could have reasonably concluded that the abuse she suffered
was not on account of a political opinion, but would have occurred if she
defied [her husband] on any matter" and that unless "there is substantial
evidence that [her husband] abused [her] on account of her political
opinion ... she is not eligible for asylum."'" Given the evidence (which
the BIA accepted as credible) of a clear and direct political element in
16. See In re T-M-B-, 211. & N. Dec. 775, 778 (BIA 1997).
In determining the motivation for threats or harm in an actual or imputed political
opinion asylum claim, the record must be examined for direct or circumstantial evi-
dence from which it would be reasonable to conclude that those who threatened or
harmed the respondent were in part motivated by an assumption that her political
views were antithetical to their cause.
Id. See also In re S-P-, 211. & N. Dec. 486 (BIA 1996).
17. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Persecutory conduct may
have more than one motive, and so long as one motive is one of the statutorily enumerated
grounds, the requirements have been satisfied"). See also Tagaga v. INS, 228 F.3d 1030 (9th
Cir. 2000); Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000); Gutierrez v. INS, No.
98-70214, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29235 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 1999); Borja v. INS, 175 F3d 732
(9th Cir. 1999); Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Sarrazola, (1999) 166
A.L.R. 641 (Austl.); Chokov v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (F.C.A.
1999), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au.htm.; Jahazi, 61 F.C.R. at 299-300.
18. Alfaro-Rodriguez v. INS, No. 98-70289, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 31945, at *6 (9th
Cir. Dec. 2, 1999).
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the applicant's risk of being persecuted, the court's (extraordinary) af-
firmation of the BIA decision can only be explained on the basis of an
underlying rejection of the notion that the Convention definition is capa-
ble of being satisfied when multiple factors are at play, and an apparent
assumption that the presence of a nonpolitical motive proves the absence
of a political motive. 9
In another decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld the BIA's rejection of the claim of a Guatemelan man
who feared persecution by guerillas. The guerillas had tried on numerous
occasions to recruit him into their ranks and had accused him of "having
the same mind set" as his brother who was serving in the Guatemalan
army. The BIA rejected his political opinion claim on its own assessment
of a "reasonable" guerilla's mindset: "[the BIA] did not believe [the ap-
plicant's] testimony that the guerillas would attempt to induct him into
their ranks at the same time that they attributed a pro-military opinion to
him because of his brother's military service. 20 The Board accepted the
Immigration Judge's assessment that therefore "[t]he recruitment was
motivated by the fact that the respondent is a young, healthy male, not
for any of the five grounds enumerated in [the Convention]."'2' As the
dissent rightly points out, the Immigration Judge's rejection of the claim
(affirmed by the BIA and the majority of the Ninth Circuit) notwith-
standing evidence of imputed political opinion (which was not rejected
on credibility grounds) directly contradicts the previously-accepted prin-
ciple 2 that the Convention definition is satisfied where the persecution is
feared merely "in part" for a Convention reason.23 Although not overt, in
effect this constitutes a sole factor test.
This is not an isolated problem, rather there are countless examples
of this phenomenon 24 including a case in which the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit accepted that the applicant "feared
persecution because of his membership in a 'particular social group'-
the royal family of the Esubete of Nigeria," but rejected his claim
nonetheless because it was really "on account of a personal dispute"2 ; a
19. Cf Tarubac v. INS, 182 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that "the presence
of a nonpolitical motive for persecution does not, without more, prove the absence of a politi-
cal motive."). See also Alfaro-Rodriguez, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 31945, at *9-'*10 (Ferguson,
J., concurring and dissenting).
20. Sebastian-Sebastian v. INS, 195 F.3d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 1999).
21. Id. at 510-11.
22. See infra notes 70-75.
23. Sebastian-Sebastian, 195 F.3d at 516-19 (Pregerson, J. dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Ruiz v. INS, No. 97-7115, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 27937 (9th Cir. Oct. 25,
1999); Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1998); Cuadras v. INS, 910 F2d 567 (9th Cir.
1990).
25. Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1992).
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case where the same court affirmed the BIA's rejection of the claim of a
fifteen year old Haitian girl who provided evidence of past political
persecution26 where the Immigration Judge and BIA had held "that the
attack was as likely an act of crime as an instance of political
persecution"27 ; a case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit upheld the rejection of an application by a young girl
from El Salvador who "testified that the FLMN members threatened to
kill her after she told them that she supported the government" on the
basis that "the evidence suggests that her support for the government
was not the reason for their efforts to recruit her" but rather that they
tried to recruit her "because of her relatively young age"2 ; a case where
the Fifth Circuit again affirmed the BIA's rejection of an asylum
applicant on the basis that although the applicant was detained and
beaten by police after he participated in a Kurdish anti-government
demonstration, "the BIA found that the police interrogated [the
applicant] because they were seeking information on terrorist
organizations such as the PKK" 29; a decision of the Ninth Circuit which
rejected a fifteen year old Indian boy's claim that he feared persecution
by the BTF (an organization supporting an independent Sikh state) as a
result of his father's leadership in a political organization opposed to the
BTF, on the basis that the BTF "wanted to make [the applicant]
unavailable to support his father" and that this suggests that it "wanted to
punish [the applicant's] father, rather than to persecute [the applicant] for
his political beliefs" 0; and a very recent case in which the Ninth Circuit
rejected the claim of an El Salvadoran man who feared persecution from
a wealthy, local politician following the applicant's complaint to police
regarding the alleged rape of his aunt by the politician on the basis that
"the evidence suggests that he fears harm because of a personal matter
between [the applicant] and [the politician]" notwithstanding evidence
that in the "lengthy, devastating and highly polarizing civil war" then
taking place in El Salvador, the rape accusation would "also be
construed as an overtly political act, posing a direct threat to the
26. See Civil v. INS, 140 F.3d 52, 59-62 (1st Cir. 1998) (Bownes, J. dissenting) (setting
out the extensive evidence put forward by the applicant as to her well-founded fear of being
persecuted on account of political opinion).
27. Id. at 56 (stating that the court was "less willing" than the Immigration Judge to ac-
cept its proposition but nonetheless affirming the Immigration Judge's and BIA's findings).
See also id. at 65 (Bownes, J. dissenting) (criticizing the Immigration Judge for having had
"speculated that the attack on Civil's home was 'more likely' the [random] act of common
criminals than act of paramilitary forces intended as political persecution").
28. Miranda v. INS, 139 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1998). This was cited as the primary rea-
son. In addition, the Court questioned the credibility of the applicant. See id. at 627-28.
29. Ozdemir v. INS, 46 F3d 6, 8 (5th Cir. 1994).
30. Sangha v. INS, 10 F.3d 1482, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997).
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established political order"'" This problem is most acute in the United
States context due to the overwhelming focus on ascertaining the
intention of the persecutor.32 However it is not confined to cases
adjudicated in the United States; examples can be found in other
jurisdictions. For example, the British Court of Appeal recently affirmed
the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to reject a claim for
asylum by a Colombian man who gave evidence (accepted as credible)
that he feared that he would be killed by ELN guerillas or government
soldiers following his decision to leave the ELN with which he had
previously been involved.3 It was held that he had failed to prove nexus
on the basis that "the ELN did have substantial criminal as well as
political aspects to its activities" and that he had failed to prove that he
would be subject to detrimental treatment "for a Convention reason and
not merely a reprisal on the part of his former associates against a man
who had been of practical use to them. 34
In these cases, the applicants' claims were not rejected merely be-
cause of evidentiary issues or deficiencies; rather, there is a deeper
underlying assumption at work. The courts in these cases appear deter-
mined to isolate the single (or predominant) explanatory factor for the
person's predicament (or for the motivation of the persecutor to inflict
the serious harm) rather than acknowledge the complexity of the factual
situations and the interlinked matrix of factors that often lead to a per-
son's need for international surrogate protection on Convention
grounds.35 Moreover, in cases involving non-state agents operating in
highly politicized environments, there is a tendency to attempt to "surgi-
cally differentiate" the political motivations of the persecutors from
supposed non-political objectives such as extortion. The artificiality of
the reasoning which thus ensues provides powerful support for the clear
31. Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2001) (Fletcher, J. dissenting).
32. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). See also supra note 12.
33. Transcript: Smith Bernal, Guitierrez v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2000
LEXIS (C.A. May 4, 2000) (Eng.) (per Buxton, L.J.).
34. Id. at *8.
35. Indeed, this has been explicitly acknowledged by one refugee adjudicator in the
United States. In In re V-T-S, B.I.A. Interim Dec. 3308 (Mar. 6, 1997), Board Member
Rosenberg of the United States BIA acknowledged that "[bly characterizing the dispute as
nonpolitical or invoking another nonprotected motive as the reason for the persecution threat-
ened or imposed on the victim, we have too often dismissed valid claims." This has not gone
unnoticed by the courts. See, e.g., Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (2nd Cir. 1994)
(where the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, most dramatically,
the petitioner's contention that under the Board's approach, Alexander Solzhenitsyn's dispute
with the former Soviet Union would have been aptly characterized, and wrongly dismissed, as
literary and not political).
36. See In re T-M-B-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 781-91 (BIA 1997) (Rosenberg, dissenting). The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately overturned this majority stance of the BIA in Borja
v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 732 (9th Cir. 1999).
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rejection of a sole factor test in the Refugee Convention both in principle
and in practice.
B. "But for"/Common Law Test of Causation
The "but for" test, borrowed largely from tort law, has mixed support
in the refugee context and is the source of considerable confusion, dis-
agreement and conflicting interpretations and understandings among
judges. James Hathaway advocates the use of the "but for" test, which he
defines by formulating the following question for decisionmakers:
"Would the claimant be similarly at risk of serious harm but for her civil
and political status?"37 However, he emphasizes that "it is not required
that the totality of the risk faced by the claimant be specific to persons of
her civil or political status," but only that the particular level of jeopardy
faced by the applicant be linked to civil or political status. 8 This formu-
lation of the "but for" test effectively sidesteps the limitations of the
"sole cause" test to accommodate multiple causes by asking "but for the
protected ground, would the persecution have occurred?" Notwithstand-
ing this, by definition the test requires that the Convention ground
constitute the determinative factor, without which the well-founded fear
would not exist.
However, the precise relationship between this test and its counter-
part in tort law is far from clear. Under traditional tort formulations the
"but for" test cannot adequately accommodate multiple causes.39 In a
refugee context, then, where a person is being persecuted for both enu-
merated and unenumerated reasons, the "but for" test could yield
conflicting results depending on whether Hathaway's version or a more
traditional tort law version is used.4 °
Confusion surrounding the meaning and method of application of
the "but for" test in the refugee context is further magnified in the case
law due to the frequent assumption that reference to "but for" denotes
incorporation of the common law tortious standard of causation, which
begins with a "but for" analysis and then proceeds to limit legal liability
37. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 140 (1991).
38. Id.
39. See Chiles Kester, The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science and the Troubles of
Translation, Defining the Proper Role for Scientific Evidence of Causation, 74 NEB. L. REV.
529, 535 (1995) (providing a well-known example involving two fires, A and B, which meet
and subsequently cause a house to burn. It later becomes clear that either fire on its own would
have destroyed the house. In tort law, since it cannot be said that "but for" Fire A, the harm
would not have occurred, the person who set Fire A is not responsible. The same is also true
for the person who set Fire B, with the result that neither fire is found to have caused the
harm, since it cannot be said that but for one fire, the harm would not have occurred.). See
also infra notes 169-72.
40. See discussion of tort law infra notes 152-81 and accompanying text.
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by introducing policy considerations into the equation. The confusion is
particularly pronounced in the jurisprudence of the Australian courts. For
some years, various judges of the Federal Court of Australia have pro-
pounded the view that the principles of causation developed in the area
of liability for the tort of negligence are applicable in the context of the
refugee definition in the Convention. The first apparent reference to this
issue was by French, J. in Chen Shi Hat" where his Honour explained:
The courts in developing the common law and in the construc-
tion of statutes which give rise to questions about causation have
often selected some one or more out of an infinite number of
conditions to be treated as the legally relevant cause. In making
those selections the law is moved by considerations of policy,
not simply of logic .... Questions of causal connection in the
law have been described as ultimately a matter of commonsense
not susceptible of reduction to a satisfactory formula .... These
discussions have generally arisen when the question of causation
is linked to a legal liability such as, for example, damages in tort
or under statute. There is however no reason why the same ap-
proach should not be applied to determining whether an
apprehended persecution is 'for reasons of. . .' one of the speci-
fied attributes to which Article 1 of the Convention refers. Mere
application of a 'but for' test to satisfy the connection could take
the scope of Convention protection well beyond that which it
42
was intended to secure.
Such statements have been interpreted as authority for the proposi-
tion that the "but for" test, although relevant, should not exclusively
determine causation in the refugee context.43 That is, just as the common
law test of causation does not consist solely of the "but for" analysis, but
rather introduces notions of policy and common sense to guide the limi-
tation of legal liability, so too, similar principles have been imported into
the refugee context in Australia. In a number of cases the Federal Court
has reiterated that "the 'but for' test of causation [is] not to be used ex-
clusively,"44 but rather, "[t]he question whether a particular causal
41. Ultimately this decision was upheld by the High Court of Australia (after being over-
turned by the Full Federal Court). See Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 201 C.L.R. 293 (Austl.).
42. Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1998) F.C.A. 622
para. 9 (Austl.).
43. Gersten v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1999) F.C.A. 1768
para. 105 (Austl.) (per Katz, J.); Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Chen Shi
Hai, (1999) 92 F.C.R. 333, 342 (Austl.) (per O'Loughlin & Carr, JJ.).
44. Gersten, (1999) F.C.A. 1768 para. 107 (per Katz, J.). See also Chen Shi Hai (1999)
92 F.C.R. at 342 (per O'Loughlin & Carr, JJ.).
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connection between persecution and membership of a group attracts
Convention protection will be resolved not merely by the logic of causal-
ity but as a matter of evaluation which has regard to the policy of the
Convention."
It is apparent from an analysis of the Australian cases that, where it
is engaged, the policy or "common sense" test is often intended to oper-
ate as an additional hurdle to refugee applicants in order to assuage
concerns that an application of the "but for" test alone would be overly
inclusive. The concern is that reliance on the "but for" test alone could
lead to an artificial chain of reasoning that would connect factors to an
applicant's well-founded fear of being persecuted that are only remotely
(and even accidentally) related to the true reasons for fearing serious
harm. As explained by Sedley, L.J. of the British Court of Appeal in his
recent decision in Velasco v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, in the course of rejecting the submission of the applicant that a
"but for" test was appropriate in the refugee context:
[a] 'but for' test in this context opens up the possibility of an in-
finity of causes. I put to Mr Jones in argument the example of an
individual who, on the way to church, witnesses a crime and is
then threatened with serious retribution by the criminals if he or
she exposes them. But for that person's religion ... they would
not have been put in fear of persecution. Even Mr Jones, I think,
quailed at the prospect of having to argue that such a case came
within the Convention; and yet, without reducing the argument
to an absurdity, it would come within the Convention if the ap-
plicant's argument in this case were right. 6
In tort law the distinction made between the two tests is that the "but
for" test assists in measuring "causation in fact," whilst policy considera-
tions operate so as to determine "causation in law." In other words, a
plaintiff must always prove that the defendant's negligence was the "but
for" cause of his or her predicament, but may nonetheless fail to estab-
lish a claim because legal/policy considerations require a denial of
liability. 7 This approach to the issue of causation was clearly adopted by
Hill, J. of the Australian Federal Court, in the context of the Refugee
Convention, in Peiris v. Minister of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs,
wherein following the application of the "but for" test to the facts of that
case, his Honour asked "[b]ut does it follow from that inevitably as a
45. Jahazi v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, (1995) 61 F.C.R. 293, 299
(Austl.) (per French, J.).
46. Transcript: Smith Bernal, Velasco v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, para.7, 2000
LEXIS (C.A. April 2000) (Eng.).
47. See infra notes 136-53 and accompanying text for further discussion of tort law.
[Vol. 23:265
Causation in Context
matter of law, not as a matter of fact, that persecution must be found to
be motivated by political views?,
4
1
There does however appear to be some imprecision and consequent
confusion as to what exactly is meant by the use of the tort-based
"common sense" approach. In Okere v. Minister for Immigration & Mul-
ticultural Affairs, a decision often relied upon as authority for the
proposition that tort principles are relevant in the refugee context,
49
Branson, J. (of the Australian Federal Court) explained that the common
law test of causation, which requires the application of "common sense
to the facts of each case" was an appropriate approach to the construc-
tion of the refugee definition, having regard to the relevant principles of
treaty interpretation. 0 However her Honour did not refer specifically to
the "but for" test5 and her reliance on the "object and purpose" of the
Convention suggests that she intended to formulate a somewhat broad
and generous approach and not necessarily to introduce a method of nar-
rowing the application of the Convention. Her Honour explained that
another way of expressing the "common sense" approach is by asking
48. Peiris v. Minister of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1999) EC.A. 880 para. 21.
Note that an appeal was allowed by consent from this judgment on November 12, 1999.
49. This is largely because Branson, J. cited the decision of the High Court in March v. E
& M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd., (1991) 171 C.L.R. 506, a decision concerned with the law
of tort, in formulating her test to be applied in the Convention context. For example, in Ger-
sten, Katz, J. said:
It is apparent from French, J.'s remarks in Chen that his view was, and had been in
Jahazi as well, that, just as in the area of causation in the negligence context, causa-
tion in the context of the definition of a refugee for the purposes of the Convention
was not to be determined by the exclusive application of the 'but for test of causa-
tion. It appears to me further that Branson, J., by later adopting in Okere what she
referred to as 'the March v. Stramare test,' was taking the same approach as French,
J. had taken in Jahazi and Chen.
Gersten, (1999) F.C.A. 1768 para. 105.
50. Okere v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 87 F.C.R. 112,
117-18 (Austl.) (per Branson J.).
I appreciate that the March v. Stramare test is a common law test of causation, but
having regard to the principles of interpretation of treaties referred to above, it re-
flects, in my view, an appropriate approach to the construction of this aspect of
Article I A(2) of the Convention. It is, in my view, only to put the same test in dif-
ferent words to invite the identification of the true reason for the persecution which
is feared .... The RRT was required in this case, in my view, to ask itself whether,
applying common sense to the facts which it accepted, the applicant has a well-
founded fear of persecution the true reason for which is his religion.
Id. This has been assumed to encompass the "but for" test. See Peiris, (1999) F.C.A. 880 para.
19 ("It would seem clear enough that the Tribunal in the present case did not directly apply an
common law test of causation as that suggested [in Okere] by her Honour."). See also Mark
Leeming, When is Persecution for a Convention Reason?, 7 AUSTL. J. ADMIN. L. 100, 102
(2000).
51. Cf Leeming, supra note 50, at 102 (citing Okere as authority for the proposition that
"the 'but for' common law test of causation is applicable" in the refugee context).
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what is the "true reason" or indirect cause for the persecution that is
feared, an approach that was reiterated and applied in a number of her
subsequent judgments." In Okere, Branson, J. held that a Nigerian man
who feared persecution (death) from a satanic sect following his refusal
to join the sect on the basis that his Christian beliefs prevented him from
so doing, was capable of satisfying the Convention definition even
though his fear was only indirectly a result of his religious beliefs.53 The
analysis in that case reveals that this "common sense," "true reason," or
"indirect" test considers the reason (direct or indirect) for the person's
predicament rather than the motivation of the persecutor, since in Okere
there was no suggestion that members of the cult had chosen the appli-
cant because of his religious beliefs; on the contrary he had been
selected through local custom by a fortune teller" Indeed, her Honour's
citation of a seminal decision of the High Court regarding indirect dis-
crimination or disparate impact in support of this principle" makes clear
that her emphasis was on the objective nature of the inquiry (as opposed
to requiring a search for the subjective intention of the persecutor) and
not necessarily on introducing tort-based principles into refugee deter-
mination.
In her subsequent judgment in Hellman v. Minister for Immigration
& Multicultural Affairs, Branson, J. confirmed that when engaging the
language of "common sense" in previous decisions she had not intended
to equate the "true reason" test to the common law "but for" test.5 6 How-
52. See, e.g., Kanagasbai v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1999)
F.C.A. 205.
53. Okere (1998) 87 F.C.R. at 118 (per Branson, J.) (explaining that
[h]istory supports the view that religious persecution often takes 'indirect' forms. To
take only one well known example, few would question that Sir Thomas More was
executed for reason of his religion albeit that his attainder was based on his refusal
to take the Succession Oath in a form which acknowledged Henry VIII as head of
the Church of England.
Id.
54. Id. at 114.
55. Id. (citing Australian Iron & Steel Proprietary Ltd. v. Banovic, (1989) 168 C.L.R.
165, 176-77, 184 (per Deane, Gaudron & Dawson, JJ.)).
56. Hellman v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (2000) F.C.A. 645 para.
37.
Incidentally, I am unclear as to why the approach to the identification of the reason
for persecution taken by me in Okere, and in Kanagasabai in which I adopted a
similar approach, has been characterised as an application of the 'but for' common
law test of causation. I do not accept that the determination of whether a person has
,a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion' within the meaning of
Article I A(2) of the Convention calls for an application of a 'but for' test of causa-
tion.
[Vol. 23:265
Causation in Context
ever, the reasons she provided are interesting since they do not reveal a
concern that the "but for" test would provide too onerous a test but rather
that it would present too low a barrier. Her Honour acknowledged that in
the tort context, the "but for" test alone is not a sufficient indication of
legal liability as it is considered to be useful only as a "negative criterion
of causation," thus echoing concerns expressed in other decisions of the
Federal Court that application of this test would be over-inclusive and
must therefore be narrowed in some way. She stressed that the Conven-
tion test is to be differentiated from the common law test of causation
applicable in tort law and concluded that "the preferable course for the
Tribunal to adopt is to focus on the actual wording of Article 1A(2) of
the Convention."57 However this does not provide a great deal of guid-
ance other than to confirm that the Australian position is highly
subjective.
The concern that an application of the "but for" test, without more,
would encompass scenarios and predicaments outside the intended pur-
view of the Convention has also been voiced by the House of Lords and
the British Court of Appeal. In R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex
parte Shah, Lord Hoffmann took the view that the "but for" test "goes
from overcomplication to oversimplification" in its examination of cau-
sation," and preferred instead the "application of common sense notions
rather than mechanical rules."59 According to Lord Hoffmann, the "but
for" test in certain cases would yield a more generous nexus finding than
would be warranted under a "common sense" analysis. Using the exam-
ple of a time of civil unrest, during which women are particularly
vulnerable to attack by marauding men, "because the attacks are sexually
motivated or because they [the women] are thought weaker and less able
to defend themselves" he explained that while the "but for" test would
produce the result that the women would satisfy the refugee definition
(for reasons of membership of a particular social group), this would be
erroneous because the "necessary element of discrimination is lacking."
What this example reveals, however, is that his Lordship's real concern
about this scenario is that whilst there would be discrimination in effect
or impact, there would be no intent to discriminate against women qua
women in such a situation (at least according to his Lordship's analysis).
This approach then turns on his implicit view that some kind of intent
requirement is inherent in the "for reasons of" clause, rather than on the
shortcomings of the "but for" test per se. Once intent is required then
57. Id.
58. R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 654, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L.
1999) (per Hoffmann, L.J.).
59. Id.
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any causation standard formulated will be inadequate since causation
does not inherently imply any element of intent.
The underlying concern of Lord Hoffmann in Ex parte Shah has
been expressly relied upon by the British Court of Appeal in rejecting
the claim of a Nigerian man in a remarkably similar predicament to that
of the applicant in the Australian decision of Okere, discussed above. In
Omoruyi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the applicant
was at risk of persecution from a Nigerian cult following his refusal to
join it. He had been prevented from joining the cult by his Christian be-
liefs and thus submitted that his fear of being persecuted was for reasons
of religion. The Court dismissed the submission that a "but for" test was
applicable in this scenario on the basis that, just as in the "marauding
men" example provided by Lord Hoffmann in Ex parte Shah, this case
involved no element of discrimination or singling out of the applicant by
the cult on the basis of his religious beliefs. Thus, "the mere fact that as a
Christian he was more at risk than most of being harmed by the Ogboni
does not qualify him for asylum any more than [in Lord Hoffmann's
above illustration in Shah] women who during civil unrest were assumed
to be.'6° Rather, his well-founded fear "stemmed from his refusal to
comply with their demands. 6' Interestingly, this is precisely the kind of
"false dichotomy"-opposing personal reasons against Convention rea-
sons--criticized by Branson, J. in Okere.2 The difference in result, then,
between this case and Okere is not so much in the test of causation that
was applied (since Branson, J. also eschews a "but for" analysis) but in
the extent to which the respective courts were willing to consider the
objective predicament in which the applicant was placed as opposed to
the intent of the persecutors as the determinative issue. Somewhat para-
doxically, the British Court of Appeal has subsequently specifically
rejected the argument that the reasoning in Omoruyi requires an appli-
cant to prove the persecutor's motive in every case, acknowledging that
such a requirement would "confine the scope of Convention protection
in a straitjacket so tight as to mock the words in the recital ... the widest
possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms., 63 However
it is very difficult to reconcile this conclusion with the outcome in
Omoruyi. These cases serve to highlight the urgent need for greater con-
ceptual clarity to be achieved in respect of this element of refugee
determination.
60. Omoruyi v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2001) Imm. A.R. 175, 184 (Eng.)
(per Simon Brown, L.J., with whom Waller, L.J. and Forbes, L.J. agreed) (emphasis added).
61. id.
62. Okere, (1998) 87 PC.R. at 118.
63. Sepet v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't (UNHCR Intervening), 2001 E.C.W.A.
Civ. 681, 92 (Eng.) (per Laws, L.J.); id. at 154 (per Jonathan Parker, L.J.).
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The cases discussed so far have evinced a concern as to the inappro-
priate leniency of a "but for" standard. Conversely, the use of the "but
for" test in the refugee context has been rejected by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as being an unfairly high standard
on the basis that it imposes too onerous a burden on applicants and may
thus exclude some worthy applicants from satisfying the refugee defini-
tion. In Gafoor v. INS64 the court reiterated that in a case involving more
than one possible explanation for a well-founded fear of persecution
(i.e., both protected and non-protected grounds), it is necessary for the
applicant to establish only that the well founded fear is in part for rea-
sons of a Convention ground. In setting out this principle, the court
explicitly rejected an argument that it is necessary for the applicant to
establish that the protected ground was "sufficient to bring about the ac-
tion" or that "the persecution would not have occurred in the absence of
a protected ground" (i.e., a "but for" test) . In other words, the court ac-
knowledged that it is not always possible to identify the one
determinative cause of the fear of persecution without which the appli-
cant would have no well-founded fear, thus making the "but for" test an
unworkable approach in the refugee context.
The problems with the "but for" test in the context of mixed motives
often result in its abandonment in this context. For example, in more re-
cent cases involving "mixed motives" or "mixed causes/factors," the Full
Federal Court of Australia has apparently moved towards a more gener-
ous test. Rather than adopting the language of "but for," common sense
or any other method of formulating the common law test of causation,
the court has applied a quite straightforward and liberal approach
whereby "it is sufficient if one of the reasons for which persecution is
feared is a [Convention] ground."66 In response, the Australian Parlia-
ment has very recently amended the Migration Act of 1958 "so as to
narrow the interpretation given to the definition of 'refugee,' ,67 such that
64. Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 652-53 (9th Cir. 2000).
65. Id.
66. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Sarrazola, 107 F.C.R. 184, 186
(2001) (Austl.) (per Heerey, J.).
67. See Information and Research Services, Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No.
6) 2001, BILLS DIGEST No. 55 2001-02, at 1. "Over recent years the interpretation of the defi-
nition of a refugee by various courts and tribunals has expanded the interpretation of the
definition so as to require protection to be provided in circumstances that are clearly outside
those originally intended." Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6) 2001, REVISED Ex-
PLANATORY MEMORANDUM, "Outline" para. 3.
In the absence of clear legislative guidance, the domestic interpretation of our obli-
gations has broadened out under cumulative court decisions so that Australia now
provides protection visas in cases lying well beyond the bounds originally envis-
aged by the convention. These generous interpretations of our obligations
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Article lA(2) of the Convention does not apply in relation to persecution
for one or more reasons "unless that reason is the essential and signifi-
cant reason, or those reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for
the persecution."6 The explanatory material accompanying the Bill states
that "although it still may be possible to allege more than one motiva-
tion, the Convention ground must be essential, that is, if the Convention
ground were not present, there would be no fear of persecution."'69 It is
said that this standard "would appear to equate roughly with the com-
mon law 'but for' test of causation, and perhaps even the 'true reason'
test, which have been the subject of divergent views in the Federal Court
and elsewhere. 7°
This serves to highlight the confusion in existing understandings of
the nexus clause. In particular it is paradoxical that some Australian
courts have rejected the "but for" test on the basis that it would encom-
encourage people who are not refugees to test their claims in Australia, adding to
perceptions that Australia is a soft touch.
Hon. Philip Ruddock MP Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Second Reading
Speech, House of Representatives, 28 August 2001.
68. The new Section 91R (l)(a) of the Migration Legislation Amendment Act, No.6
(2001) provides that:
(1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular
person, Article I A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Pro-
tocol does not apply in relation to persecution for one or more of the reasons
mentioned in that Article unless: (a) that reason is the essential and significant rea-
son, or those reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution.
Id.
69. The background material to the Legislation states that Australian courts have found
refugee claims to have been successful where "the Convention-based elements have not been
the dominant reasons for" the harm, suggesting that the "essential and significant" reason test
equates to the requirement of finding the "dominant" motive. Migration Legislation Amend-
ment Bill (No 6) 2001, supra note 67, at "Section 91 R: Persecution" para. 19, 21 (emphasis
added).
70. BILLS DIGEST No. 55 2001-02, supra note 67, at 11. The legislative background ma-
terial claims courts have allowed refugee claims even where the Convention-based elements
have not been the dominant reasons for the harm. This allowance has contributed to a widen-
ing of the application of the Convention "beyond the bounds intended." It then goes on to say
that
[t]he Refugees Convention does not require that persecution for non-Convention
grounds be taken into account in assessing whether a person is owed protection ob-
ligations under the Convention. Where the harm feared is attributed to a number of
motivations, the proposed legislation will make it clear that it is insufficient that
there are merely minor or non-central Convention related motivations in order to
bring the persecution within the scope of the Convention. However, persecution for
multiple motivations will satisfy the proposed legislative requirements where the
Convention ground or grounds in aggregate constitute at least the essential and sig-
nificant motivation for the harm feared.
Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6) 2001, supra note 67, at "Section 91 R: Persecu-
tion" para. 19, 21.
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pass situations not properly within the purview of the Convention, whilst
the legislature has attempted to tighten and narrow the causation stan-
dard by raising the emerging "one factor" test to a "but for" standard.
In summary, the "but for" test involves more than one interpretation,
as seen particularly in the contrast between Hathaway's interpretation
and the traditional tort law formulation. Simultaneous criticisms that the
test is both too broad (finding nexus where none should exist) and too
narrow (failing to find nexus where a protected ground is one of several
causes) further indicate the existence of other interpretations of this
standard. The greatest confusion arises over how this test accommodates
(or fails to accommodate) cases involving multiple causes. It remains
unclear, for example, whether the "but for" test requires a claimant's race
to be the only cause of persecution, or the predominant cause, or a cause
of particular proportion relative to other non-protected grounds. Such
ambiguity creates problems for claimants and decisionmakers alike.
C. Contributing Cause
The "contributing cause" test provides the most inclusive standard,
requiring merely that an act be motivated at least in part by a
Convention ground or that a Convention ground constitute a factor in the
well-founded fear of being persecuted. This test is often expressed as the
corollary of a rejection of the sole test approach.7 The application of the
"at least in part" test does not require the decisionmaker to ascertain the
relative weight of each of several causes, but rather requires only a
finding that a Convention ground is a contributing cause.72 In North
America, United States Federal Circuit courts73 and the BIA cite this test,
as does the Canadian Federal Court,74 although the analysis is
71. See cases cited supra notes 13-17, rejecting the sole cause test.
72. In re S-P-, I. & N. Dec. 486, 497 (BIA 1996) ("Notably, the Board in Matter of B did
not become entangled in the impossible task of determining whether harm was inflicted be-
cause of the applicant's acts or because of his beliefs underlying those acts.").
73. Maini v. INS, 212 F.3d 1167, 1176 n.l (9th Cir. 2000) ("That CPM members may
have had an additional economic reason to persecute Mr. Maini does not affect our conclusion
that the CPM persecuted him and his family at least in part on account of a protected
ground."); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 732 (9th Cir. 1999); Gutierrez v. INS, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 29235, at *1; Singh v. llchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1501 (9th Cir. 1995); Osorio v. INS, 18
F.3d 1017, 1028 (2nd Cir. 1994); In re T-M-B, B.I.A. Interim Dec. 3307 (Feb. 20, 1997); In re
S-P-, I. & N. Dec. 486 (BIA 1996); Matter of Fuentas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (BIA 1988).
74. See Zhu v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. 80 (per
MacGuigan, J.) ("[I]t is enough for the existence of political motivation that one of the mo-
tives was political"). See also Shahiraj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
No. IMM-3427-00, 2001 Carswell 969 para. 20 (Fed. Ct. of Can., Trial Div., May 9, 2001)
(finding "there is reason to believe that the applicant was not randomly targeted for extortion
by the police, but that they targeted him based at least partially on his own association with his
brother (who had ties to militants) and /or his own imputed political ties to militants").
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undertaken, at least in the United States, in the context of a search for the
motives of the persecutor.75 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has articulated the approach as follows:
As this court has made clear, the statute covers persecution on
account of political opinion even where the persecutor acts out
of mixed motives. Put another way, the protected ground need
only constitute a motive for the persecution in question; it need
76
not be the sole motive.
This approach has also been adopted in Australian decisions involving
mixed motives.77
The "contributing cause" approach has often been applied in extor-
tion cases, in which it is difficult to separate the elements of personal
interest and Convention grounds such as race and nationality as factors
contributing to the applicant's predicament. Appellate and superior
courts have often been critical of an approach, adopted by lower tribu-
nals and decisionmakers, which determines a claim "by the application
of a simple dichotomy": "Was the perpetrator's interest in the extorted
personal or was it Convention related? ' T8 In rejecting this simplistic as-
sessment, superior courts have required decisionmakers to undertake a
more sophisticated evaluation, allowing "for the possibility that the ex-
torsive activity has [a] dual character."79 As the Federal Court of Canada
has explained, "[p]eople frequently act out of mixed motives, and it is
enough for the existence of political motivation that one of the motives
was political."8°
75. See supra note 12.
76. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing its previous decision in Borja,
175 F.3d at 736, where it had explained that, "Given this test, we conclude that Ms. Borja's
undisputed testimony compels the conclusion that she was persecuted by the NPA, at least in
part, on account of her political opinion.").
77. See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Abdi, (1999) 162 A.L.R. 105,
112 (per O'Connor, Tamberlin & Mansfield, JJ.); Minister for Immigration & Multicultural
Affairs v. Sarrazola, (1999) 166 A.L.R. 641, 645-46 (per Einfeld, Moore & Branson, JJ.);
Chokov v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1999) F.C.A. 823 para. 29, 32
(per Einfeld, J.).
78. Rajaratnam v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (2000) Fed. Ct. Un-
reported Judgments (Reed Int'l Books Austl.) 1111 (Fed. Ct. Austl. Aug. 10, 2000) (para. 48)
(per Finn & Dowsett, JJ.). See also Tagaga v. INS, 228 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000). In Zhu,
Judge MacGuigan of the Canadian Federal Court explained that: "[tlhe panel was in error in
setting up an opposition between friendship and political motivation. His motives were
"mixed" rather than "conflicting." [1994] F.C.J. 80 para. 2 (Can.). See also Shahiraj, No.
IMM-3427-00, 2001 Carswell 969.
79. Rajaratnam, (2000) Fed. Ct. Unreported Judgments para. 48 (per Finn & Dowsett,
JJ.) See also Yazitchian v. INS, 207 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2000).
80. See Zhu, [1994] F.C.J. 80 para. 1.
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What remains unclear, however, is whether there is a minimum
threshold that must exist before a protected ground falls within the scope
of the test. Isolated comments suggest that some courts envisage that a
minimum level of significance of the factor to the well-founded fear of
being persecuted is required, although rarely is this minimum element
elucidated in any meaningful way. For example, in Jahazi, French, J.
stated that while it is not necessary that the fear of persecution be solely
attributable to membership of a relevant social group, a decisionmaker
"can have regard to the extent to which membership of the relevant
group is a factor in the risk of persecution. 8' In other cases, terms such
as "significant motivation" have been mentioned, although a close read-
ing of these cases suggests that such references are made in relation to
the nature of the particular evidence in the cases rather than to a mini-
mum test that must be satisfied.82
Overall the language engaged by the courts, namely, "in part" and "a
factor," suggests that the Convention factor need not be the most impor-
tant, essential or central factor in the well-founded fear of being
persecuted. This is borne out by an analysis of the reasoning undertaken
by the courts. For example, in Lim, the Ninth Circuit described its previ-
ous holding in Borja as an "extortion plus" case; that is, a case of
extortion with a political element. Extrapolating from that reasoning, the
court found that the facts in Lim suggested that it was a "revenge plus"
case-"revenge partly motivated by (and thus on account of) imputed
adverse political opinion."83 It is clear that, according to this approach,
the "on account of" or "for reasons of" clause can be satisfied notwith-
standing that the Convention ground was not the dominant nor primary
ground for the persecution.
Of course, it should be noted that the analysis above in relation to
the "sole ground" test reveals that despite formulating a liberal test in
principle, courts do not always apply the test to the facts in individual
81. Jahazi v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, (1995) 61 F.C.R. 293, 300
(Austi.) (per French, J.) (proceeding to affirm the rejection of the refugee application, but not
on the basis that the Convention ground was not sufficiently significant). See also Sarrazola v.
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1999) F.C.A. 101 para. 47 (Austl. Feb. 7,
1999) (per Hely, J.) (setting aside the decision of the RRT to reject the applicant's refugee
claim on the basis that the RRT "erred in law in deciding that the applicant's fear of persecu-
tion was not for reason of her family membership without at least considering the extent to
which membership of the family is a factor in the risk of persecution"); Minister for Immigra-
tion & Multicultural Affairs v. Sarrazola, (1999) 166 A.L.R. 641 (upholding on appeal).
82. See, e.g., Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The evi-
dence compels a finding that Geovanni's sexual identity was a significant motivation for the
violence and abuse he endured .... We have recognized that persecutory conduct may have
more than one motive, and so long as one motive is of one of the statutorily enumerated
grounds, the requirements [for asylum] have been satisfied.") (alteration in original).
83. Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2000).
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cases. Notwithstanding this, it remains true that the "contributing cause"
or "a factor" test is the most liberal in the existing case law.
Interestingly, the United States Department of Justice has recently
proposed an amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
regulations governing the determination of asylum eligibility that would
provide that in cases "involving a persecutor with mixed motivations"
the applicant "must establish that the applicant's protected characteristic
is central to the persecutor's motivation to act against the applicant.""
This is similar to the recently enacted legislation in Australia, requiring
that the Convention reason constitute the "essential or significant" reason
for the well-founded fear of being persecuted. The United States
amendment is said to be necessary to achieve clarity and uniformity of
interpretation following "conflicting interpretations of the extent to
which the persecutor's motivation must relate to a protected characteris-
tic.""3  However, this assertion of conflicting interpretations is
questionable since although there may be inconsistencies in the applica-
tion of the standard among the Circuit Courts of Appeal, the exposition
of principle is quite consistent. 6 Moreover, the public responses to the
proposed rule submitted pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act87
have been overwhelmingly critical of this restrictive interpretation with
commentators expressing concern that the more restrictive test will im-
pose a prohibitively high and unrealistic burden on applicants and that
the use of the word "central" might lead some adjudicators to apply a
sole cause test on the basis that only one motivation/cause can be cen-
tral.8"
84. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 236 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified
at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. The explanatory note to the proposed amendment cites only one case in support of
the more onerous position. In Gebremichael v. INS, the court said that "[a]n applicant qualifies
as a 'refugee' under the INA if membership in a social group is at the root of persecution,"
such that membership itself generates a "specific threat to the applicant." 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st
Cir. 1993). However, it is important to note that the court was there considering the definition
of "social group" within the meaning of the Convention and was not considering the nexus
clause. In a later portion of the judgment the court turned to a consideration of the latter, when
it stated "We now turn to the question of causation." Id. at 37. It is therefore by no means clear
that the court was intending to impose a higher burden on applicants in respect of the nexus
determination. See also Memorandum from Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic of
Greater Boston Legal Services, Inc. and Harvard Law School on Asylum and Withholding
Definitions, to INS 8-9 (Jan. 19, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Harvard Immigration
Memo].
87. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2001).
88. See, e.g., Comments of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights on INS No. 2092-
00 (on file with author); AG Order No. 2339-2000 at 9-10 (Jan. 20, 2001) (on file with au-
thor); Harvard Immigration Memo, supra note 86, at 9; and Memo from the American
Immigration Lawyers Association on Asylum and Withholding Definitions, to the INS, at 6
(Jan. 17 2001) (on file with author) (describing the proposed amendment as a "major step
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D. Tests in Progress
Some courts have acknowledged that the "for reasons of" clause in-
volves "a question of causation"89 but have deferred the formulation of
an appropriate test to a future time, on the basis that it is unnecessary to
decide such a difficult issue unless strictly necessary. For example, in the
decision of the House of Lords in Ex parte Shah, Lord Steyn turned to
the "causation test" and noted that various tests had been put forward by
the parties in the case, including a "but for" test (by the applicants) and
an "effective cause" test (by the Secretary of State), although Lord Steyn
did not elucidate the meaning or intended operation of the different tests.
His Lordship ultimately considered that the facts of that case so clearly
manifested a causal connection that "the legal issue regarding the test of
causation ... need not be decided."9 Similarly, in Refugee Appeal No.
71427/99, the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, following
a thoughtful analysis of the nexus issue, concluded, "we do not in this
decision have to decide what, in the refugee law context, is the appropri-
ate causation test, an issue also left open by Lord Steyn in Shah."9'
E. No Test
Despite the existence of this wide variety of approaches to the causa-
tion question, courts often fail to define a specific causation standard or
to undertake any reasoning in relation to the "for reasons of" clause at
all. Alternatively, some courts have explicitly approached the nexus
question as purely one of intent which, as alluded to above, is not an an-
swer to the question of what standard of causation is applicable. For
example, in Elias-Zacarias, the United States Supreme Court made a
nexus determination without any explicit examination of the issue of
causation. Rather it approached the question of the linking mechanism
by focusing solely on the persecutor's motive or intent.92 However, as
backwards in evolving jurisprudence" and warning that it "would place an impossibly high
evidentiary burden on asylum seekers to prove their attacker's motivations, and result in
judges and asylum officers denying asylum to individuals who could not prove their attackers'
central motivations. These are precisely the types of situations the mixed motives case law was
designed to remedy." See also Memorandum from Hastings College of Law, Center for Gen-
der and Refugee Studies on Asylum Withholding Definitions, to the INS, at 6 (Jan. 18, 2001)
(on file with author).
89. R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, Islam v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 646, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L.
1999).
90. Id.
91. Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, Refugee Status Appeals Authority, para. 115 (N.Z.
2000).
92. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 478 (1992). That this is the approach of
United States courts is borne out by subsequent lower court decisions. For example, in
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Daniel Steinbock observes, "[t]he plain meaning of 'on account of' does
not provide a definitive answer to whether such a factor may be one of
several reasons for the harm, must be the predominant reason, or must be
the only reason."' Canadian courts have also displayed an unwillingness
to engage in any detailed discussion of the meaning of the nexus clause,
taking the view that the nexus determination is "largely a question of
fact" and "therefore entirely within the tribunal's expertise to make. 9'
Where Canadian courts have discussed the nexus clause, they have
tended to analyze it from the perspective of the intention of the alleged
persecutors. 9 On the other hand, the Federal Court of Canada has
warned that adjudicators should not "base [their] determination as to
whether or not a claimant has established a nexus to the Convention on
the subjective belief of the alleged persecutors themselves, especially
since these alleged persecutors are obviously not present at the hearing
... and cannot testify as to their own subjective state of mind,, 96 leaving
the position somewhat unclear.
Canas-Segovia, the Ninth Circuit explained that in a pre-Elias-Zacarias decision, "we took
pains to explain that although evidence of a persecutor's intent was relevant, it was not
required." Canas-Segovia v. INS 970 F2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992). However, following the
decision of the Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias and the remand of Canas-Segovia to the
Ninth Circuit by the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that it had been
wrong to grant the petitioner's application on the basis of his well-founded fear of being
persecuted for religious reasons, since although "Canas-Segovia argues that (I) it is
undisputed that his sincere religious convictions require him to refuse to serve in the military,
(2) his refusal to serve is a religious practice and (3) he is being persecuted because of his
religious practice i.e. his refusal to serve," he was unable to show evidence of his persecutor's
intent and therefore, his claim based on religious persecution had to be rejected. Canas-
Segovia, 970 F.2d at 601.
93. Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Convention, 45 UCLA L. REv. 733, 763
(1998).
94. Leon v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 58 A.C.W.S. (3d)
289.
95. See Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3
FC. 540 ("[T]he mental element which is decisive for the existence of persecution is that of
the government, not that of the refugee."). See also Rizkallah v. Canada (Minister of Employ-
ment and Immigration), [1992] 156 N.R. 1; Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 747 (stating
that "[tihe examination of the circumstances should be approached from the perspective of the
persecutor, since that is the perspective that is determinative in inciting the persecution."); id.
at 749 (distinguishing the United States decision of Elias-Zacarias since "[in Ward's case, a
contrario, his act was inconsistent with any other possible motives .... The rational underly-
ing his decision was unequivocal, both in his eyes and in those of the INLAy thus implicitly
approving of the approach in Elias-Zacarias).
96. Shahiraj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3427-00,
2001 Carswell 969 para. 19 (Fed. Ct. of Can., Trial Div., May 9, 2001). See also Zhu v. Can-
ada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1994] FC.J. 80; Salibian v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 250, the seminal civil war case, where the
Canadian Federal Court appeared to approach the nexus question from the perspective of the
applicant's fear:
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A novel variation in approach is that taken by the High Court of
Australia in Chen Shi Hai, a case involving the Chinese government's
persecutory treatment of "black children" (children born outside the pa-
rameters of China's one child policy). The Court there suggested that
devising a single causation test or analysis for all Convention grounds
may not be feasible, instead proposing that "the question whether par-
ticular discriminatory conduct is or is not persecution for one or other of
the Convention reasons may necessitate different analysis depending on
the particular reason assigned for that conduct."97 The Court then pro-
ceeded to elucidate an approach to the nexus inquiry that closely
resembles the adjudication of constitutional rights in the United States. It
set out a hierarchy of scrutiny, with race, religion, and nationality requir-
ing the strictest scrutiny, since "ordinarily, race, religion, and nationality
do not provide a reason for treating people differently"; thus, "if persons
of a particular race, religion, or nationality are treated differently from
other members of society, that, of itself, may justify the conclusion that
they are treated differently by reason of their race, religion or national-
ity."98 In relation to membership of a particular social group and political
opinion, the position was said to be more complex, since different treat-
ment of persons falling within those groups may be warranted if
appropriate and adapted to "achieving some legitimate object of the
country [concerned]." Thus, an analysis of the "for reasons of" clause
could involve the court in an examination of the justification for different
treatment and a balancing of the degree and severity of the different
treatment against the purported legitimate aims and objects of the sanc-
tion."
A situation of civil war in a given country is not an obstacle to a claim provided that
the fear felt is not that felt indiscriminately by all citizens as a consequence of civil
war, but that felt by the applicant himself, by a group with which he is associated,
or if necessary by all citizens on account of a risk of persecution based on one of
the reasons stated in the definition.
Id.
97. Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 201 C.L.R.
293, 302 (Austl.) (per Gleeson, C.J., Gaudron, Gummow & Hayne, JJ.).
98. Id. at 302-03.
99. See, for example, the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court in interpret-
ing the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has constructed a
hierarchy of review whereby race is the most "suspect" category on which to base a distinction
in treatment, giving rise to the strictest scrutiny by the courts, while "gender" is quasi-suspect,
yielding an intermediate level of review. There are other limited categories that might also give
rise to heightened review (i.e., heightened beyond rational basis review) such as alienage and
illegitimacy. In cases involving race, the government must establish that a racial classification
is "necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective." See Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). That is, the distinction must be "justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be necessary to the accomplishment of its legitimate purpose."
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
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This is a curious method of approaching the nexus question. The
statement that a different causation test may apply to different
Convention grounds is not justified in the Convention text; nor is an
approach that implies a stronger connection to a Convention ground
merely by reference to a superimposed hierarchy of scrutiny. In truth
however, the reasoning can be understood as more appropriately directed
to the question whether particular treatment or conduct amounts to
persecution than to the nexus question. Indeed, it tends to presuppose
that the evidence is clear, or that a determination has already been made,
that a distinction in treatment is explained by reference to one of the
Convention grounds. It does not assist in ascertaining whether
persecutory treatment is in fact for a Convention reason since it starts
from the premise that the discriminatory treatment at issue is based on a
Convention ground and to that extent is not actually a causation standard
or test."°°
Ultimately the Court in Chen Shi Hai undertook the nexus determi-
nation based on the presumptive analysis that once it is accepted that
"black children" are a social group for the purposes of the Convention,
that they are treated differently from other children, and that the different
treatment amounts to persecution, "there is little scope for concluding
that that treatment is for a reason other than his being a 'black child.' ""
Interestingly, the Court stated that a different conclusion would be open
only where the persecution was referable solely to some other attribute
or characteristic, other than the fact of being a "black child," clearly en-
visaging the possibility of mixed reasons in a Convention claim.' °2
In a concurring opinion in Chen Shi Hai, Kirby, J. eschewed the
adoption of a particular formula or test to assist in the application of the
"for reasons of" standard, on the basis that "it is neither practicable nor
desirable to attempt to formulate 'rules' or 'principles' which can be sub-
stituted for the Convention language."' 3 His Honour instead proposed
that,
the decision-maker must evaluate the postulated connexion be-
tween the asserted fear of persecution and the ground suggested
to give rise to that fear. The decision-maker must keep in mind
100. This approach is also highly context-specific; a different analysis of causation
would presumably be required in the case of persecution by non-state agents, since it is diffi-
cult to imagine persecution by non-state agents (which the state is unable or unwilling to
control) ever being considered appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of
the country concerned.
101. Chen Shi Hai, (2000) 201 C.L.R. at 304 (per Gleeson, C.J., Gaudron, Gummow &
Hayne, JJ.).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 314.
[Vol. 23:265
Causation in Context
the broad policy of the Convention and the inescapable fact that
he or she is obliged to perform a task of classification. Quite
simply, many acts lend themselves to ready assignment to differ-
ent 'reasons.' Human conduct is rarely, if ever, uni-
dimensional. "
One very important aspect of the Court's decision in Chen Shi Hai is
that the Court acknowledged that, in the context of the question whether
a law of general application can amount to persecution for a Convention
reason, "general laws, which are apparently non-discriminatory, may
impact differently on different people and, thus, operate discriminato-
rily, 05 thus moving away from an intent-focused approach. Moreover, in
rejecting the need to prove "enmity," "malignity," or "adverse intention"
on the part of the persecutor, Kirby, J. warned against subjecting the
words of the Convention "to earlier more extreme meanings of persecu-
tion" which placed greater emphasis on persecutory intent.'
In sum, courts recognize the complexity of the nexus issue. How-
ever, the pervasive confusion and inconsistent application of causation
standards in nexus determinations have resulted either in poorly articu-
lated standards, incomplete or inconsistent analyses, or a complete
failure to examine the nexus element altogether.
II. DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD
IN THE REFUGEE CONTEXT
A. Causation Should be Context-Specific
As the above discussion displays, when discussing causation stan-
dards in the refugee context by reference to standards in other areas of
law, courts often draw on tort principles, almost to the exclusion of other
104. Id. at 314-15. See also Gersten v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs,
(2000) F.C.A. 855 para. 28 (Austl.).
105. Chen Shi Hai, (2000) 201 C.L.R. at 301 (per Gleeson, C.J., Gaudron, Gummow &
Hayne, JJ.). See also Wang v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (2000) F.C.A.
1599 para. 63 (per Merkel, J.) where his Honour said:
While, generally, punishment for breach of a criminal law of general application
will not constitute persecution for a Convention reason, the proposition contended
for by the Minister that prosecution under generally applicable laws cannot amount
to persecution for a Convention reason is erroneous. Before such a conclusion can
be reached in a particular case the circumstances of the individual concerned must
be considered. That consideration will usually occur in the context of an inquiry
into the nature of the law, the motives behind the law, whether the law is selectively
or discriminatorily enforced or impacts differently on different people. (emphasis
added).
106. Chen Shi Hai, (2000) 201 C.L.R. at 312.
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areas of law in which causation plays a role. Moreover, this reference is
made without any real analysis of its relevance or appropriateness to the
refugee context; rather it is merely assumed that tort law provides an
obvious model. This is a serious deficiency because "[q]uestions of cau-
sation are not answered in a legal vacuum. Rather, they are answered in
the legal framework in which they arise."'' 7
Different aims and policy objectives inform different areas of the
law. As a result, one danger of transplanting doctrines from one area of
law into another is that the principles appropriate in one area with one
set of objectives might become irrelevant or even inappropriate in an
area with different objectives.' 8 Justice MacLachlin (now Chief Justice)
of the Canadian Supreme Court described this phenomenon in a discus-
sion concerning the wisdom of importing tort doctrines into
consideration of equitable principles. Her Honour expressed concern
with "proceeding by analogy with tort" in that such an approach "over-
looks the unique foundation and goals of equity. ' " Rather,
the better approach, in my view, is to look to the policy behind
compensation for breach of fiduciary duty and determine what
remedies will best further that policy. In so far as the same goals
are shared by tort and breach of fiduciary duty, remedies may
coincide. But they may also differ. The danger of proceeding by
analogy with tort law is that it may lead us to adopt answers
which, however easy, may not be appropriate in the context of a
breach of fiduciary duty."0
The dangers inherent in "transplanting" arise particularly in the
refugee context where courts have referred to and borrowed concepts
from other areas of the law. Rather than focusing on the object and pur-
pose of the Convention, which is concerned with providing international
protection to persons at serious risk of harm, courts too often adopt tests
more appropriate to ascertaining criminal or civil liability, without ac-
knowledging these doctrinal differences or attempting to adapt the
imported tests accordingly.
The most poignant example of the dangers inherent in such an ap-
proach is contained in the reasoning of the Federal Court of Australia in
107. Chappel v. Hart, (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 238 (Austl.) (per Gaudron, J.). See also
HL.A. HART & A.M. HONORI9, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 26 (1959).
108. See, e.g., IW v. City of Perth, (1997) 191 C.L.R. 1, 66 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.) (stating
that in the context of causation in anti-discrimination law, that the tribunal below was "led into
error by its use of inapplicable analogies instead of concentrating on securing the objects of
this particular Act as expressed in its language.").
109. Canson Enter. Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 545 (per McLachlin,
J., delivering the judgment of Lamer, CJ., and L'Heureux-Dubd, J.) (Can.).
110. Id.
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Gersten v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs' wherein it
was held:
If the 'but for' test is not to be used exclusively in [the refugee]
context, but its application is to be 'tempered by the making of
value judgments and the infusion of policy considerations,' then,
it appears to me, one may consider for transfer to that context
those value judgments and policy considerations which have
tempered the application of that test in the negligence context."1
2
One such tempering matter in the negligence context which the court
in Gersten thought relevant to the adjudication of refugee determinations
was that "it may be 'unjust' to hold a defendant legally responsible for
an injury which, though it may be traced back to the wrongful conduct of
the defendant, was the immediate result of unreasonable action on the
part of the plaintiff.""' 3 The court then said:
No good reason appears to me why, in the context of ascertain-
ing legal responsibility for persecution in the Convention
context, the 'but for' test of causation should not be tempered by
the use of a matter similar to that which was referred to by
Gummow and Kirby JJ in Chappel, namely, unreasonable action
by the person claiming to have been persecuted, the immediate
result of which unreasonable action was the suffering by that
person of the alleged persecution.
' 
4
111. (1999) F.C.A. 1768 para. 101-11 (per Katz, J.).
112. Id. para. 108.
113. Id. para. 110 (quoting from Gummow, J. in Chappel v. Hart, (1998) 195 C.L.R.
232).
114. Id. para. 112. The court then applied these principles to the facts in Gersten as fol-
lows:
To translate that matter to the present case, it appears to me to have been open to the
Tribunal to conclude that, although there might be here an appearance of responsi-
bility in the State Attorney's office for Mr. Gersten's detention, because, but for the
State Attorney's office investigation into the theft of Mr. Gersten's car, Mr. Gersten
would not ultimately have been detained, nevertheless that appearance of responsi-
bility was displaced by Mr. Gersten's unreasonable action of refusing to comply
with Dean, J.'s order to answer certain questions put to him by Mr. Band, his deten-
tion being the immediate result of such unreasonable action by him.
That, in fact, is what I interpret the Tribunal to have been saying when giving its
reasons for refusing to attribute legal responsibility for Mr. Gersten's detention to
the State Attorney's office and attributing it instead to Mr. Gersten's own conduct.
Id. para. 112-13.
The decision of the single judge of the Federal Court, referred to here, was appealed to
the Full Federal Court. See Gersten v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs,
(2000) F.C.A. 855. In the course of dismissing the appeal, the Full Federal Court did discuss
the "for reasons of" clause but did not refer specifically to the importation of tort-related
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The reasoning in this case has led one commentator to conclude that
"some conduct by [refugee] applicants, if it is unreasonable will sever
any causal connection which might otherwise have existed.""5
The obvious problem with this approach is that it fails to take into
account the different objectives and underlying aims of the different
areas of law. While it is true that the object of causation and other
elements of tort law is to ascertain legal responsibility for a wrong, it is
not the case that the object of the Refugee Convention is to "ascertain[]
legal responsibility for persecution." On the contrary, the sole aim of the
Convention is to provide protection, including certain rights and benefits,
to those falling within the definition of "refugee" and is not, on any
possible reading of its terms, concerned with ascertaining "liability" or
guilt for persecutory acts. As the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) has observed, "[tihe legal regime of refugee
protection ... is centered on the grant of a humanitarian benefit, not on
the punishment of persecutors."" 6 Moreover, the introduction of notions
of disqualifying "unreasonable conduct" on the part of refugee
applicants ignores the fact that the Convention sets out the circumstances
in which a person will be excluded from its operation in very specific
concepts undertaken by Katz, J. See id. para. 23-35. Therefore it is not clear whether the Full
Federal Court was impliedly rejecting this approach or, by declining to comment upon it and
affirming the judgment below, was in fact impliedly accepting it. The fact that the court
affirmed the statement of Kirby, J. in Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 201 C.L.R. 293, 315, that "it is neither practicable nor desirable
to attempt to formulate 'rules' or 'principles' which can be substituted for the Convention
language," Gersten, (2000) F.C.A. 855 para. 28, may suggest that it would reject a tort based
approach. Ultimately it may be that the failure to discuss these issues reflects the way it was
argued by counsel. Following the decision of the Full Federal Court, the applicant sought
special leave in the High Court of Australia, which was refused on 2 October 2001. See EX
parte Gersten, S78/2001 (2 Oct. 2001), transcript available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/
au/otherlhcaltranscripts/2001/S78/2.html. Interestingly, these issues were not canvassed by the
applicant at the High Court stage, thus the Court did not refer to them in oral argument or in
its reasons for refusing special leave. See id.
115. Leeming, supra note 50, at 100, 102.
116. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees in Support of Respondent at 16, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). See
also Ulrike Davy, Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Are They Genuine? 18 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 53, 107.
Foremost, the standards for establishing refugeehood are unmistakably different
from the standards of a criminal investigation. Allegations of asylum seekers are not
to be read as 'charges,' and the asylum procedure is not about the 'guilt' of the per-
secutor. The allegations provide a basis for the agency's decision on the well-
foundedness of the applicant's fear of being persecuted. The important question of
whether or not there are good reasons to fear persecution can only be answered if
the agency takes the victim's perspective and-to decide upon the well-
foundedness-the perspective of an informed observer.
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and definite terms,"7 and it is not open to state parties, as a matter of
international law, to formulate new exclusionary provisions outside the
scope of the Convention terms."8 Finally, the introduction of the notion
of "unreasonable conduct" on the part of the claimant is inconsistent
with the well-recognised principle that, in relation to other aspects of the
refugee definition, entitlement is not forfeited merely because the risk
arises from claimant's own conduct no matter how unreasonable. That is,
it has been held that an assumption that a person with a strongly held
religious or political belief "should act reasonably, and compromise that
belief to avoid persecution, would be contrary to the humanitarian
objects of the Convention."" 9 Thus, to introduce the notion that
"unreasonable conduct" can sever the causal connection is dangerous
and inconsistent with existing authority.
This practice of introducing tort notions of negligence and contribu-
tory fault into refugee law appears to be restricted to this case, but
nonetheless dramatically demonstrates the risks involved in adopting
tests from other contexts into refugee law. The tendency to draw on the
tort analogy with implicit faith in its adaptability to the refugee context
should give courts pause to consider what the consequences of such ac-
tion may be. As Gersten illustrates, this practice is fraught with hazard.
This is not to say that decisionmakers and policymakers should not
"take wisdom where we find it, and accept such insights offered by the
law of tort" among other areas.' 20 However, any test that courts adopt in
the refugee context must be grounded in an understanding of the aims
and purpose of the Convention and must be framed in a manner which
gives full effect to the Convention definition.' 2' As recently emphasized
by the New Zealand Court of Appeal, "[o]ur concern must be the policy
117. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 1 (F) (setting out the persons to whom the Con-
vention shall not apply). Article I(C) sets out the persons to whom the Convention will cease
to apply. Id. art. 1 (C).
118. Id. art. 42 (stating Article 1 of the Convention may not be derogated by state par-
ties).
119. Omar v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (2000) F.C.A. 1430 para.
38 (per Black, CJ., Ryan & Moore, JJ.), cited in Wang v. Minister for Immigration & Multi-
cultural Affairs, (2000) F.C.A. 1599 para. 85 (per Merkel, J.). See further authority discussed
in Wang at para. 82-91, 99.
120. Canson Enter. Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 545-46 (per
McLachlin, J., delivering the judgment of Lamer, CJ., and L'Heureux-Dub, J.) (Can.).
121. This approach has recently been adopted by the 15 Member States of the European
Union at the Tampere European Council of October 1999 where Member States agreed to
work toward establishing a common European Asylum System "based on the full and inclu-
sive application of the Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to
persecution, i.e. maintaining the principal of non-refoulement." Tampere European Council,
Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999, para. 13 at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/
conclu/oct99/.
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of the statute [or Convention] rather than the policy of the common
law. ,'22
B. The Particular Challenges of Refugee Adjudication
Determinations of causation in refugee law grow increasingly more
complex. The kinds of situations that precipitated forced migration
(within the auspices of the Convention) at the time the Convention was
drafted do not necessarily represent the majority of circumstances in
which people seek international protection today. For example, persecu-
tion by non-state agents, whose aims and motivations may be diverse
and complex, are far more common in contemporary cases, thus raising
the issue of multiple causes."3 Indeed as reflected in the case law, cases
involving "multiple causes" are now the rule rather than the exception.'24
Multiple causes arise frequently in situations of guerilla warfare and at-
tacks by insurgent groups and in the situation of civil wars, where
decisionmakers must determine whether harm was due to purely general-
ized violence, civil strife related to a protected ground, or some complex
combination thereof.
2 5
Even in cases where courts are able to determine the multiple causes,
gaps in the available evidence are often so significant as to seriously
impede the nexus determination. Difficulties in cross-cultural communica-
122. Atkinson v. Accident Rehab. Comp. and Ins. Corp., N.Z. Court of Appeal, 9 Octo-
ber 2001, para. 25 at http://www.brookers.co.nz/legal/judgments.
123. Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
229, 240 (1996).
In today's chaotic world, the identity and the motivations of the persecutor are more
elusive. Not only have many totalitarian regimes fallen, the state itself has vanished
in some refugee-producing locales. Repression comes at the hands of shadowy or-
ganizations whose links to state authority are deliberately obscured or who portray
themselves as antagonists of the formal state .... Criminal profit motives are in-
creasingly and more visibly linked to the impulse for political dominance.
Id.
124. THE QUESTION OF A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES FROM
SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND SERIOUS INTERNAL DISTURBANCE 14 (G.J.L. Coles ed.,
1989). "Today, the international refugee problem is essentially that of one or more of a num-
ber of different but closely related conditions within the country of nationality which can
compel the exodus of nationals." Id.
125. N.Z. Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal No. 71462/99, 27 Septem-
ber 1999, para. 30.
It is common to find that in civil wars and other situations of generalized violence
that human rights abuses are committed not only by the combatants on the different
sides ... but also by other groups and individuals who may have no connection
with either the state or any of the warring factions. Very often the reasons for the
commission of human rights abuses will be mixed.
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tion,'26 lack of access to corroborating evidence in foreign countries, in-
ability to procure witnesses, faulty interpreting or incomplete
transcription into the court record, a reluctance to discuss traumatic
events, a fear or mistrust of interrogating officials, and simple memory
failure comprise only a few of the obstructions to evidence-gathering in
refugee cases.127 Some courts have acknowledged the particular difficulty
of fact-finding in the civil war context. 2 As the New Zealand Refugee
Status Appeals Authority observes, "the very nature of civil war situa-
tions will often preclude access to the facts required for judgments of
this kind to be made. More often the decisionmaker will, of necessity, be
forced to make a broad and general assessment"'0
29
Multiple causes and evidentiary gaps-so characteristic of refugee
law-pose serious challenges to successful nexus determination. Ulti-
mately, causation standards in the refugee context must operate clearly
and consistently to accommodate both multiple causes and evidentiary
ambiguity.
C. Obtaining Guidance from Causation Standards
in Different Fields of Law
Causation is a complex and controversial issue in many areas of law
and it is difficult to find a simple test that is uniformly applied and
understood in almost any area of the law. Indeed it has been admitted
that in considering the question of what is the appropriate test of
causation, "[ji]udges have been known to despair in their quest for the
answer."'"3 Part of the problem arises from the artificial nature of a legal
analysis of causation. For example, courts have frequently stated that the
126. See generally Walter Kilin, Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunder-
standings in the Asylum Hearing, 22 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 230 (1986).
127. See generally ROBERT F. BARSKY, CONSTRUCTING A PRODUCTIVE OTHER: DIs-
COURSE THEORY AND THE CONVENTION REFUGEE HEARING (1994).
128. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Abdi, (1999) 162 A.L.R. 105
para. 21 (per O'Connor, Tamberlin and Mansfield JJ.)
In order to appreciate what is covered by such civil or clan warfare, it is essential
for a decision-maker to look beyond the existence of a state of war to determine
whether the war is directed to objectives such as securing power, property and ac-
cess to resources, or whether in reality it is directed against persons or groups
because of race, religion or group membership. Unless attention is focused on the
reasons for the war, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the an-
tagonism is based on Convention grounds. It is not enough to dismiss an application
simply on the basis that there is a war without looking at the motivations or pur-
poses involved. Civil wars vary greatly in character and objectives.
Id.
129. N.Z. Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Refugee Appeal No. 71462/99, at para. 51.
130. Bank of N.Z. v. N.Z. Guardian Trust Co. Ltd., [1999] 1 N.Z.L.R. 213, 239 (per
Fisher, J.).
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legal concept of causation differs from scientific and philosophical
notions of causation:
In philosophy and science, the concept of causation has been de-
veloped in the context of explaining phenomena by reference to
the relationship between conditions and occurrences. In law, on
the other hand, problems of causation arise in the context of as-
certaining or apportioning legal responsibility for a given
occurrence. 
1
31
This dichotomy between "legal" causation and scientific or philo-
sophical causation should be kept in mind when analyzing causation in
the refugee context, particularly since, as explained above, the
Convention focuses solely on protecting those who are persecuted and
not on apportioning liability and blame for wrongful acts. By contrast,
nearly every other area of law is concerned with ascertaining liability for
civil and criminal wrongs. Therefore, the development of appropriate
tests of causation in those contexts is largely influenced by policy
considerations which inform the issue of what legal consequences should
attach to certain conduct. 132
Moreover, other bodies of law are concerned with developing appro-
priate tests for ascertaining what caused an event in the past rather than
looking forward to a potential future risk. For this reason, decisionmak-
ers in these contexts deal with issues that are more certain and definable,
and are more likely to have access to evidence to assist in their findings
of fact. By contrast, refugee law is concerned with assessing whether a
person has a well-founded risk or fear of future persecution in another
country, making the evidentiary burden on the applicant much heavier.
Past persecution is relevant, but only as it bears upon the question of fu-
ture risk.
133
With these important caveats in mind, and remaining cognizant of
the dangers of "transplanting" discussed above, the following discussion
surveys the role and meaning of causation in three fields of law in order
to gain perspective from different existing tests. This survey is not under-
taken with a view to locating the particular causation test that should be
"transplanted" from an area of domestic law into the Refugee Conven-
tion. Rather, the aim is to provide an overview of broad approaches to
causation in order to understand the role that it plays in different fields of
law and the distinct approaches to its determination in various contexts.
131. March v. E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd., (1991) 171 C.L.R. 506, 509 (per
Mason, C.).
132. Ernest J. Weinrib, A Step Forward in Factual Causation, 38 MOD. L. REv. 518
(1975).
133. See generally HATHAWAY, supra note 37, at 66-70.
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In particular, it is useful to gain an understanding of the law's ability to
mould causation standards to accommodate particular challenges preva-
lent in different fields of law. This is principally useful in assuaging
concerns that adopting a liberal standard of causation in the refugee con-
text would be novel or that to do so would effectively abandon a causal
analysis altogether."'"
The Article aims to identify those areas where the conceptual under-
pinnings and policy concerns are most analogous to the context of
refugee law and to discount those that are least analogous. As an exam-
ple of something in the latter category, criminal liability presents a body
of law and policy that is largely irrelevant to the refugee context. The
aims of the criminal justice system are fundamentally different from the
objectives of the Refugee Convention, leaving little utility in using it to
illuminate an investigation of causation in the refugee context. Criminal
law is concerned with ascertaining liability or culpability for an offence
and thus focuses solely on the responsibility of the perpetrator of a
crime. Given the consequences for the defendant of a criminal convic-
tion, the prosecution faces a high burden of proof-namely, proof
beyond reasonable doubt-which extends to every element of an of-
fence, including the issue of causation."' Similarly, although an initial
consideration of the question of causation in international refugee law
might lead one to turn to causation in international law more generally,
closer consideration suggests against seeking guidance from the law on
state responsibility (the key area of international law in which causation
is relevant) since the policy bases of the two areas are fundamentally
different.
36
134. See generally Gafoor v. INS, 231 E3d 645, 652-63 (dissenting opinion).
135. The UNHCR has recognized the distinct policy goals of refugee and criminal law,
commenting that, "refugee status examiners are not called upon to decide the criminal guilt or
liability of the persecutor, and refugee status is not dependent on such proof." See DEBORAH
ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 5, 271 n.33 (1999) (quoting from
UNHCR, Inter-Office Memorandum, Mar. 1, 1990).
136. The doctrine of causation in the field of state responsibility is concerned with at-
tributing liability for an internationally wrongful act since it is only "injury ... caused by the
internationally wrongful act of a State for which full reparation must be made." Report of the
International Law Commission (53rd Sess.), U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 227,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001)(adopting draft articles on state responsibility). The ILC has ex-
plained:
[Tihe allocation of injury or loss to a wrongful act is, in principle, a legal and not
only a historical or causal process. Various terms are used to describe the link which
must exist between the wrongful act and the injury in order for the obligation of
reparation to arise. For example, reference may be made to losses 'attributable [to
the wrongful act] as a proximate cause,' or to damage which is 'too indirect, remote
and uncertain to be appraised'.... Thus causality in fact is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for reparation. There is a further element, associated with the
exclusion of injury that is too 'remote' or 'consequential' to be the subject of
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Instead the Article turns to three areas of domestic law, namely, tort
law (negligence), equity/breach of fiduciary duty, and anti-discrimination
law. First, tort law is considered because refugee judges most frequently
refer to this when formulating tests for the "for reasons of" clause. It is
therefore useful to consider the extent to which reference to this body of
law is helpful in the refugee context. Second, the Article moves from the
common law to the equitable field, and particularly to breach of fiduci-
ary duty, since the policy goals underlying equity are similar to those in
the refugee context, and courts in the field of equity have attempted to
modify and ameliorate the strictness of the common law in order to pro-
vide maximum protection to vulnerable groups. Finally, the analysis
turns to anti-discrimination law because although concerned with civil
liability, the underlying principles resonate with those underpinning
refugee law. In considering these three areas of law, the Article focuses
on those issues that correlate to the particular challenges facing refugee
law, namely, multiple causes and evidentiary gaps.
1. Tort
Causation has "plagued courts and scholars more than any other
topic in the law of torts."'37 The function of the doctrine of causation in
the context of unintentional torts or negligence is to "assign a duty to
take reasonable steps to prevent a foreseeable risk of harm of the kind in
issue."' 3 ' It is concerned with "the allocation of legal responsibility rather
than [merely] the determination of what has happened."'39 Given this
conceptual framework, the law of torts addresses both factual and legal
causation. Weinrib explains the distinction as follows:
Under the rubric of cause in fact, the focus is a historical one,
and attention is directed to the simple questions of what hap-
pened, of whether the defendant's conduct produced the injury.
The second rubric, that of proximate cause or remoteness, deals
with what is usually a much more complex question: Assuming
that the defendant's conduct did result in the injury, what legal
reparation. In some cases the criterion of 'directness' may be used, in others
'forseeability' or 'proximity.'
Id. at 227-28.
137. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 172 (7th ed. 1987). See also Richard W.
Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985).
138. Chappel v. Hart, (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 238 (Austl.) (per Gaudron, J.).
139. March v. E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd., (1991) 171 C.L.R. 506, 529 (per
McHugh, J.).
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consequences should the law attach to the defendant's con-
duct?' °
It is important to emphasize that the only aspect of causation rele-
vant to the refugee context is that of factual causation: the "simple
questions of what happened" or, in the case of refugee law, "what may
happen." Since refugee decisionmakers are not concerned with appor-
tioning liability, it is unnecessary to ascertain the second level of
causation, that is, what should, as a matter of policy, be the legal ramifi-
cations or consequences of a "defendant's" conduct. This means that
notions of "proximate cause," "forseeability," "novus actus interveniens,"
and "direct cause" are irrelevant in the refugee context as they are prin-
ciples developed by courts to limit legal liability on policy grounds.
This is vital because the most prevalent problem with the use of tort
doctrines in refugee law, at least in common law systems, is the
importation of both factual and legal notions of causation. The most
common method of importing issues of legal causation in refugee cases
is via the "common sense" approach to causation analysis, discussed
above. 4 ' The elision of factual and legal causation is easily (and
seemingly unconsciously) made in the refugee context because in many
common law countries the question whether a person is responsible in
tort for a certain event involves "considerations of policy" which "have a
prominent part to play, as do accepted value judgments" in the task of
attributing responsibility for tortious activity. 42 In other words, the test of
factual causation, the "but for" test, is modified by the application of
policy considerations as an additional layer of the test of legal causation,
which is most often encapsulated in the shorthand phrase "common
140. Weinrib, supra note 132, at 518.
141. See R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State for
the Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 654, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L.
1999) (per Steyn, J.). See also Hellman v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs,
(2000) FC.A. 645 para. 36-39 (Austl.) (per Branson, J.); Gersten v. Minister for Immigration
& Multicultural Affairs, (1999) F.C.A. 1768 para. 108 (Austl.) (per Katz, J.); Okere v. Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 87 F.C.R. 112, 117-18 (Austl.) (per Bran-
son, J.).
142. E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd., (1991) 171 C.L.R. at 515 (per Mason, C.J.).
In the same case, McHugh, J. explained that "common sense" like other doctrines such as
"proximity" is "the product of a policy choice that legal liability is not to attach to an act or
omission which is outside the scope of that rule even though the act or omission was a neces-
sary precondition of the occurrence of damage to the plaintiff." Id. at 531. This is the position
in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. See generally Chappel, (1998)
195 C.L.R. 232 (per Gaudron, J.); Farrell v. Snell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 (Can.); Envtl. Agency
v. Empress Car Co. (Abertillery) Ltd., (1999) 2 A.C. 22; Alphacell Ltd. v. Woodward, 2 All
E.R. 475 (1972); Sew Hoy & Sons Ltd. v. Coopers & Lybrand, [1996] 1 N.Z.L.R. 392.
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sense." '4 3 Because the notion of "common sense" is well entrenched in
the common law legal tradition, it is tempting, as evidenced above, to
import similar notions into the refugee context. However, this raises
some fundamental problems and should be strongly resisted.
The test itself is vague, largely because courts have declined to elu-
cidate the test in a way which provides any meaningful guidance to
decisionmakers. Indeed, whether it can even be described as a test is
questionable. One judge of the New Zealand Court of Appeal has said
that "common sense is not itself a test" and that causation in tort is not
resolved by reference to a formula but "by the application of a Judge's
common sense."'" A common sense approach introduces an element of
arbitrariness into the refugee determination process in that notions of
"common sense" and "policy" are inherently subjective. For example, in
the context of Australian tort law it has been acknowledged that a con-
clusion on causation "is often reached intuitively,"'' 45 and that since the
test "is not susceptible of reduction to a satisfactory formula"'' 46 this
branch of the law is "highly discretionary and unpredictable."' 4 7 Indeed
one Justice has criticized the unprincipled nature of such a test in the tort
context on the basis that it allows "tribunals of fact, under the guise of
using commonsense, to determine legal responsibility by applying their
own idiosyncratic values" and "subjective, unexpressed and undefined
extra-legal values.'48
Given the arbitrariness of this standard, its application can lead to
vastly different results. 19 Not only may there be "different answers to
questions about causation when attributing responsibility to different
people under different rules" but there may be "different answers when
attributing responsibility to different people under the same rule"'"5
143. See E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd., (1991) 171 C.L.R. at 515 (Mason, C.J.)
(explaining the difference between factual and legal causation. The court is to apply "common
sense to the facts of the particular case" in order to ascertain liability.). See also Chappel,
(1998) 195 C.L.R. at 238 (per Gaudron, J.) (citing Studey v. Gypsum Mines Ltd., (1953) A.C.
663, 681 (per Reid, L.J.)); Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311; Empress Car Co. (Abertillery) Ltd.,
[1999] 2 A.C. 22; Alphacell Ltd., 2 All E.R. 475 (1972); Coopers & Lybrand, [1996] 1
N.Z.L.R. at 392.
144. See Coopers & Lybrand, [1996] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 408-09.
145. Chappel, (1998) 195 C.L.R. at 290 (per Hayne, J.).
146. Penn, (1954) 91 C.L.R. at 277-78.
147. Chappel, (1998) 195 C.L.R. at 264 (per Kirby, J.) quoting A.M. Honor6, Causation
and Remoteness of Damage, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW XI Ch.
7 § 105 (K. Zweigert ed., 1981)).
148. E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd., (1991) 171 C.L.R. at 533 (per McHugh, J.).
149. See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, (2000) 178 A.L.R.
120, 134-35 (Austl.).
150. Empress Car Co. (Abertillery) Ltd., [1999] 2 A.C. at 30.
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This discrepancy is borne out by a consideration of the method by
which refugee decisionmakers have dealt with the notion of "common
sense." In some cases it may provide a positive result for the applicant.'5'
However, in other cases the courts introduce it as a way of rejecting ap-
plicants from the protection of the Convention.' The dangerous
potential of such a malleable and subjective test appears starkly in the
decision of the Full Federal Court of Australia in Chen Shi Hai, where
Justices O'Loughlin and Carr stated, after referring to the "common law
test of causation,":
In terms of the policy reflected by the Convention, we do not
think that it was part of that policy to enable parents, who have
been held not be refugees, to confer refugee status on their chil-
dren by bringing those children into the world in circumstances
where that very procreation is contrary to the policy of laws of
general application in their country of origin. The policy of the
Convention is to require a great deal of international altruism
and benevolence on the part of a receiving State, but unless a
common sense line is drawn to distinguish between those who
are real refugees from those who are not, there will be a risk that
genuine refugees will be penalized .... Once one appreciates
that purpose and scope, one can give a common sense answer to
the question of causation in the present matter. ' 3
This effectively "abandon[s] the quest for standards"'54 by positing
the test as whether the particular decisionmaker views the applicant as a
"real" or "genuine" refugee who is "worthy" of protection. It also invites
an "I know it when I see it approach"'55 reminiscent of the "self-
definition" so vividly criticized by Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson
by reference to Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland. 
56
151. See, e.g., Okere v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 87
F.C.R. 112, 112 (Austl.).
152. See, e.g., R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State
for the Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 649, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545
(H.L. 1999) (per Hoffmann, L.J.).
153. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Chen Shi Hai, (1999) 92 F.C.R.
333, 342-43, rev'd, (2000) 201 C.L.R. 293 (Austl.) (emphasis added).
154. See Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 C.L.R.
225, 369 (Austl.) (per Gummow, J.).
155. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
156. Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206,245 (H.L. 1942). See also Minis-
ter for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Yusuf, (2001) 180 A.L.R. 1, para. 112 (Austl.)
(per Kirby, J).
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Similarly, in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v.
Khawar,'7 a decision involving very similar facts to Ex parte Shah, Hill,
J. dissented from the majority's decision to affirm the claim for refugee
status,' 58 stating:
I do not think that a common sense approach would lead to the
conclusion that the situation the applicant found herself in, and
the situation in which she might find herself were she repatriated
to Pakistan, would warrant a finding that she was persecuted just
because she was a woman. No doubt the fact that she was a
woman had a part to play in the alleged persecution, both be-
cause it was the foundation of her marriage to an alcoholic and
abusive husband and because of the fact that she was a married
woman meant that the police offered her no assistance. But I do
not think that it is correct to say in all the circumstances that her
persecution was by reason of her membership in any particular
social group.5 9
This reveals the highly subjective nature of the common sense test,
which effectively allows a decisionmaker to eschew objective analysis and
a reasoned assessment of why the "for reasons of" clause is not satisfied
even where "the fact that she was a married woman meant that the police
offered her no assistance," in favor of a conclusory statement that the case
at bar just doesn't seem like one that should fall within the Convention.
The adoption of a subjective "common sense" test also contradicts
the notion of a non-derogable, uniformly-applied definition. 6 Most
157. See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, (2000) 178 A.L.R.
120, 120 (Austl).
158. The majority of the Full Federal Court of Australia dismissed the appeal against the
single judge of the Federal Court who had set aside a decision of the RRT by which the RRT had
affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister refusing to grant protection visas to the re-
spondents. Id. Although the decision has not been delivered at the date of publication of this
Article, the High Court of Australia has granted special leave to the Minister to appeal in this
case.
159. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
160. Article 42(l) of the Convention provides "any State may make reservations to arti-
cles other than to Article L " Although some flexibility and autonomy is accorded state parties
in interpreting Article I of the Convention, wide divergences in interpretation pose a threat to
the validity of an international protection regime. Accordingly, the Executive Committee of
UNHCR has sought to develop greater consistency within the refugee regime. For example it
has acknowledged "the value of regional harmonization of national policies to ensure the
persons who are in need of international protection actually receive it and calls upon States to
consult UNHCR at the regional level in achieving this objective." United Nations High
Comm'r for Refugees, Executive Committee, Conclusions, No. 74 (XLV) [1994] General
Conclusions on International Protection, para. (p). Similarly, the UNHCR has stated that, "The
UNHCR has constantly sought to bring about a certain measure of uniformity in the elabora-
tion of eligibility criteria with a view to ensuring that all applicants are treated according to
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importantly, since the "common sense" test is concerned with attributing
liability, it is of no conceptual relevance to refugee law. Thus, any guid-
ance to be obtained from tort law should focus on tests relevant to factual
causation.
a. Factual Causation in Tort Law
The most common method of ascertaining causation in fact remains
the "but for" test which Prosser explains as, "the defendant's conduct is a
cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that con-
duct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if
the event would have occurred without it.' 6' Others have described the
"but for" test as asking whether the particular condition was necessary to
complete a set of conditions jointly sufficient to account for the given
162
occurrence.
The "but for" test provides at least one element of the test of factual
causation in a wide array of both common law and civil law jurisdic-
tions.' 63 However, despite its universal application, the "but for" test has
been extensively criticized as being both over and under-inclusive.'
64
First, it can be over-inclusive because "the mere fact that something con-
stitutes an essential condition (in the 'but for' sense) of an occurrence
does not mean that, for the purposes of ascribing responsibility or fault,
the same standards" Executive Committee, Report on International Protection (submitted by
the High Commissioner), 27th Sess., para. 30, U.N.Doc. A/Ac.96/527.
161. WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984).
162. See FLEMING, supra note 137, at 173-74.
163. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 161, at 263-72; Chappel v. Hart, (1998) 195
C.L.R. 232 (Austl.); Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 (Can.). In a recent survey of causa-
tion issues in tort law in Austria, Belgium, England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, South
Africa, Switzerland, and the United States it was concluded that all of these jurisdictions rec-
ognize causation as a requirement of tortious liability, and all legal systems consider a
condicio sine qua non [but for test] as such as a first test.
All jurisdictions recognize causation as a requirement of tortious liability and all le-
gal systems consider a condicio sine qua non [but for test] as such as a first test ....
According to the condicio sine qua non-requirement, also known as the but for-test,
equivalence theory, 'cause-in-fact' or factual cause, one should, in order to deter-
mine whether an act or omission was a cause of the loss, eliminate the act or
omission mentally and consider whether or not the loss would still appear. If the
loss does not occur when the act or omission is eliminated, the act or omission is a
condicio sine qua non for the loss. If the loss would still occur, even where the act
or omission in question is disregarded, the loss has not been caused by this act or
omission.
Jaap Spier & Olav A. Haazen, Comparative Conclusions on Causation, in UNIFICATION IN
TORT LAW: CAUSATION 127 (Jaap Spier ed., Kluwar Law International 2000).
164. The "but for" test "frequently fails as a means for determining whether the minimal
requirements for causal relationship have been met." Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-
in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 88 (1956).
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it is properly to be seen as a 'cause' of that occurrence as a matter of ei-
ther ordinary language or common sense.' ' 65 For example, a factor which
secures the presence of the plaintiff at the place where and at the time
when he or she is injured is not necessarily causally connected with the
injury.'" For this reason it has been described as a "test of exclusion."'6
These concerns resonate with those raised by Sedley, L.J. in the refugee
context, in Velasco, discussed above, wherein his Lordship expressed
concern that the application of a "but for" test could lead to "an infinity
of causes.' 68
Second, it is under-inclusive in that its strict application can result in
a finding of no liability (and hence no remedy for the plaintiff) in cases
of "overdetermination,' 69 that is, where two separate but equally causa-
tive factors combine to produce the tortious damage. The classic
example is the case where a fire started through the negligence of a rail-
road merges with a fire of undetermined origin and the two together
destroy the plaintiff's property. In such a case it cannot be said that either
of the fires was the "but for" cause of the plaintiff's loss, since the loss
would have occurred in the absence of either of the fires.'7° However
such an outcome, as the law recognizes, is clearly unjust.' Thus, it has
been said that the assumption that a defendant can only be liable when
his or her conduct was a causa sin qua non of injury "has its dangers"
since there are situations in which the law may wish to regard a defen-
dant as having caused an injury even though it would have occurred
without his participation.'
Another major problem with the "but for" test is that it is specula-
tive; it requires one to consider a hypothetical scenario in which the
165. March v. E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd., (1991) 171 C.L.R. at 523 (Austl.)
(per Deane, J.)
166. Id. at 516 (per Mason, C.J.).
167. Weinrib, supra note 132, at 518.
168. Transcript: Smith Bernal, Velasco v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, para. 7,
2000 LEXIS (C.A. April 2000) (Eng.).
169. E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd., (1991) 171 C.L.R. at 516-17 (per Mason,
C.J.).
170. This example comes from the decision in Valentine v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.
Ry., 118 N.W. 970, 974 (Mich. 1908) as cited in David W. Roberston, The Common Sense of
Cause in Fact, 75 T'x. L. REV. 1765, 1776 (1997). See also D.M.A. Strachan, Variations on
an Enigma, 33 MOD. L. REV. 378, 391-95 (1970); Malone, supra note 164, at 81-89; Cook v.
Lewis, [1952] D.L.R. I (Can.).
171. See, e.g., E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd., (1991) 171 C.L.R. at 516-17; id. at
523 (per Deane, J.).
172. Strachan, supra note 170, at 378. Courts have acknowledged the shortcomings of
the "but for" test in the context of multiple causes. In E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd.,
Mason, C.J. explained, "In truth, the application of the test proves to be either inadequate or
troublesome in various situations in which there are multiple acts or events leading to the
plaintiff's injury." (1991) 171 C.L.R. at 516.
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relevant factor or ground is not present and ascertain what would have
been the outcome in that case. 173 Malone describes the problems with this
approach:
At other times the but-for test demands the impossible. It chal-
lenges the imagination of the trier to probe into a purely fanciful
and unknowable state of affairs. He is invited to make an esti-
mate concerning facts that concededly never existed. The very
uncertainty as to what might have happened opens the door wide
for conjecture.' 74
It has been said that the "but-for" theory of causation places "unreal-
istic expectations on our adversary system" when "we ask a judge to find
as a matter of fact what would have occurred" in the absence of the rele-
vant factor.' 5
This is particularly problematic and indeed exacerbated in the refu-
gee context since the decisionmaker's task is already hypothetical to a
certain degree in that it requires an assessment of the likelihood that the
applicant may face persecution in the future. 76 The evidentiary difficul-
ties in assessing likely future events in a foreign country compound the
difficulties for the decisionmaker in making this hypothetical assess-
ment.
Furthermore, although the "but for" test does not, in theory, equate
to a "sole cause" test, in practice it can risk focusing the decisionmaker
on finding a sole cause. Chen Shi Hai demonstrates this problem where,
rather than assessing the situation as a whole, and considering the multi-
farious factors that led to the predicament which the applicant faced, the
Full Federal Court narrowly sought to pinpoint the one "but for" cause,
as though it existed in isolation from the complex matrix of facts.
77
173. Weinrib, supra note 132, at 522 ("[W]e slide into the question of what did not hap-
pen or rather what would have happened if what had happened had not happened.").
174. For this reason the "but for" test has been discredited by its originator even for phi-
losophical usage. Malone, supra note 164, at 67. See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 263 (1989).
175. Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title Vll Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 320 (1982). Courts have recognized these
difficulties with the "but for" test; for example, in E. & M.H. Stramare Proprietary Ltd.,
Mason, C.J. said, "it is often extremely difficult to demonstrate what would have happened in
the absence of the defendant's negligent conduct." (1991) 171 C.L.R. at 514.
176. Hamer points out that the distinction between past and future is not limited to the
law. He explains, "[Pihilosophers have suggested that our everyday experience of time is
asymmetric. The past has already happened and is, in principle, knowable. The future on the
other hand, is a matter of chance, and is a far less certain object of knowledge." David Hamer,
'Chance would be a fine thing': Proof of Causation and Quantum in an Unpredictable World,
23 MELB. U. L. REv. 557, 559, 562-566 (1999).
177. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Chen Shi Hai, (1999) 92 F.C.R.
333, 342 ("In our opinion, in terms of causation, the respondent does not face persecution 'by
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The shortcomings of the "but for" test have generated various modi-
fications and it is clear that it rarely suffices as the sole test of factual
causation.'8 As mentioned above, the "but for" test has been criticized in
the tort context on the basis of its inability to deal adequately with mul-
tiple causes, particularly where either of two causes (either concurrent or
successive) was capable of causing the loss. In such a case, some have
called the "but for" test "unworkable"'7 9 and have therefore substituted or
modified it with a "substantial factor" test' ° to be applied in these "joint
causation" cases. 8 ' This is particularly applied in the United States
where courts formulate the modified test as follows: the defendant's
conduct causes the event if it was "a material element and a substantial
factor in bringing it about."' 82 If the defendant's conduct was a substan-
tial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, then the defendant remains
liable, notwithstanding the fact that another person's negligence was a
contributing cause and that that person also remains liable."83
Prosser criticizes the substantial factor test which, in his view, "can
scarcely be called a test," and posits an alternative formulation that ad-
dresses directly the problem with the "but for" test in the multiple cause
scenario as follows:
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event
that their combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for
cause of the event, and application of the but-for rule to them in-
dividually would absolve all of them, the conduct of each is a
cause of the event.'1
This alternative formulation has the advantage of simplicity--one
does not need to address whether a factor is "substantial," a concept that
reason of' being a member of the social group 'black children.' He faces such persecution by
reason of his parents' conduct (as Chinese nationals) in contravening the relevant laws of
China.") In overturning the decision of the Full Federal Court, Kirby, J. explained that the
RRT's error was in part "because the Tribunal thought itself obliged to classify the 'reasons'
for the persecution which it found by ascribing them solely to the breach by the parents of
laws and programmes of general application in the PRC designed to uphold that country's
population control policy." Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
(2000) 201 C.L.R. 293, 316.
178. See Spier & Haazen, supra note 163, at 127-30.
179. Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, 466 (Can.); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
161, at 266.
180. Most notably the United States. See Robertson, supra note 170, at 1776; Wright,
supra note 137, at 1776.
181. It is said that in the United States context, "'but for' causation is still a requirement
in all cases except special joint causation cases." See Kester, supra note 39, at 534.
182. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 161, at 267.
183. See ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 102--04 (5th ed. 1993); FLEMING,
supra note 137, at 172.
184. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 161, at 268.
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is not necessarily self-evident. It has significant potential for use in the
refugee context in cases of multiple reasons/factors in which decision-
makers are simply unable to unravel the particular degree of significance
of each individual factor.
Another modification of the "but for" test in the context of multiple
possible causes is the formulation of a test which asks whether the negli-
gence of the defendant materially contributed to the loss of the
plaintiff.' However, courts often interpret this strictly, so that a mere
increase in risk alone will not suffice to constitute a material contribu-
tion.1 6 In Australia the harshness of the test has been said in some cases
to give rise to "a lingering sense of injustice." '87 On the other hand, some
authority exists for the proposition that in order to accommodate acute
evidentiary difficulties, particularly in areas that depend on medical
knowledge, the plaintiff can establish liability by proving merely that the
defendant's conduct increased the risk of contracting the disease.88 A
distinction that has been drawn in order to explain these differing ap-
proaches of common law courts is between independent and cumulative
causes. In cases involving multiple possible (independent) causes, courts
tend to require a "but for" standard to be satisfied by the plaintiff,"'89
whereas in cases involving cumulative causes, courts have been more
willing to find that "guilty exposure may still be considered a cause,
though a lesser cause than the innocent exposure, on the basis that it may
have 'tipped the scale.' ,,90 In other words, in the latter category courts
have held that a mere increase in risk can suffice to establish liability.' 9'
185. Chappel v. Hart, (1998) 195 C.L.R. 232, 239 (Austl.) (per Gaudron, J.); Athey v.
Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, 458 (Can.). However, it is unclear whether this is merely a
modification of the "but for" test or whether it is effectively a different and less onerous test.
Justice Major's judgment (of the Canadian Supreme Court) in Athey suggests that it is a lower
test, where his Honour stated that "[a] contributing factor is material if it falls outside the de
minimis range." Id. at 466. "[A]s long as a defendant is part of the cause of an injury, the de-
fendant is liable, even though his act alone was not enough to create the injury." Id. at 467; cf.
Chappel, (1998) 195 C.L.R. at 232.
186. Bendix Mintex Proprietary Ltd. v. Barnes, (1997) 42 N.S.W.L.R. 307, 316 (Austl.)
(per Mason, J.).
187. Id. at 317 (per Mason, J.).
188. Id. at 345; McGhee v. Nat'l Coal Bd., 1 W.L.R. I (H.L. 1973); Naxakis v. W. Gen.
Hosp., (1999) 197 C.L.R. 269, 278-79 (Austl.); Chappel, (1998) 195 C.L.R. at 244 (per
McHugh, J.); Seltsam Proprietary Ltd. v. McGuiness, (2000) 49 N.S.W.L.R. 262 (Austl.). See
also John G. Fleming, Probabilistic Causation in Tort Law, 68 CAN. BAR REv. 661 (1989);
Donna H. Smith, Note, Increased Risk of Harm: A New Standard for Sufficiency of Evidence
of Causation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 65 B.U. L. REV. 275 (1985). However, this has
been subjected to criticism in the torts context. See Weinrib, supra note 132, at 523. For an
overview and explanation of the cases, see Hamer, supra note 176, at 614-26.
189. Hamer, supra note 176, at 628.
190. Wilsher v. Essex Area Health Auth., I Q.B. 730, 752 (C.A. 1987) (per Mustill, L.J.).
191. This has also been recognized in the United States. See Wright, supra note 137, at
1814. See generally Smith, supra note 188.
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This has particular resonance with the causation issue in refugee law
since in many cases the Convention ground will operate as a cumulative,
rather than truly independent, cause of the person's risk of being perse-
cuted. For example, in an extortion case, the persecutor may be
motivated by personal greed to a certain degree, however the applicant's
race may "tip the scale" in his decision to threaten the applicant with
serious harm. Whilst it may be impossible to ascertain the relative
weight of these factors, it is possible to identify race as a factor that in-
creased the risk of persecution.
b. Tentative Conclusions From Tort Law
The above analysis suggests that the doctrine of legal causation in
tort law offers little of use to the refugee decisionmaker. Turning to fac-
tual causation, the most prevalent test, the "but for" test, has been
criticized in the tort context and many of the identified problems are fur-
ther exacerbated in the refugee context. However, some of those
formulations developed to "soften" the test may offer some assistance.
While tests such as "materially contributed" and "substantial factor" may
be too onerous, especially given that they are thought to produce injus-
tice in some tort cases, Prosser's alternative formulation which focuses
on the fact that a particular cause can contribute to the totality of causes
offers a helpful framework. Similarly, contemporary developments that
respond to the particular evidentiary challenges presented by cases of
cumulative causes, whereby a factor that contributes to or increases risk
may be sufficient to establish a claim, offer valuable insight in respond-
ing to the challenges faced in refugee determination.
2. Equity
Equity embodies the rules and principles developed by the Court of
Chancery in England, which "corrected, supplemented and amended the
common law."' 92 It originated as an attempt to "soften[ ] and modif[y]"
the harshness of the common law,'93 and to provide remedies where the
common law was deficient so as to deliver justice in individual circum-
stances.' 94 The law of equity recognizes and regulates certain proprietary
interests (equitable interests and estates, including the position of the
192. R.P. MEAGHER ET AL., EQUITY DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES 3 (3d ed. 1992).
193. Id.
194. Although the reorganization of the court system achieved by the Judicature Acts of
1873 and 1875 produced one court administering both common law and equity, this effected
"not a fusion of two systems of principle but of the courts which administer the two systems."
O'Rourke v. Hoeven, (1974) I N.S.W.L.R. 622, 626 (Austl.) (per Glass, J.). Thus, both the
common law and equity continue to operate as independent bodies of principles and doctrines.
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beneficiaries under discretionary trusts),'95 imposes duties and obliga-
tions on persons found to be in a fiduciary relationship with others, and
provides equitable remedies not available at common law.'96 Although
equity is also concerned with the imposition of liability, it holds the po-
tential to provide significant insight into the role of causation in the
refugee context.
First, the concepts of breach of trust, and in particular breach of fi-
duciary duty, are analogous to failure of state protection-both sets of
concepts involve a breach by one party of special obligations owed to
another.' 97 As has been emphasized throughout this Article, refugee law
is designed to provide surrogate or substitute protection when "the de-
gree of protection normally to be expected of the government is either
lacking or denied."' 98 Refugees receive international protection when "a
state will not or cannot comply with its classical duty to defend the in-
terests of citizenry."'99
Second, the key doctrinal differences between tort and contract on
the one hand, and equitable principles on the other, suggest that equita-
ble principles relating to causation may offer more assistance than does
the common law in ascertaining the appropriate test in the refugee con-
text. Justice McLachlin of the Canadian Supreme Court explained the
conceptual difference between common law and equitable remedies, in
the context of fiduciary duty, as follows:
The basis of the fiduciary obligation and the rationale for
equitable compensation are distinct from the tort of negligence
and contract. In negligence and contract the parties are taken to
be independent and equal actors, concerned primarily with their
own self-interest. Consequently the law seeks a balance between
enforcing obligations by awarding compensation and preserving
195. MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 192, at 103.
196. For an explanation of the nature of the fiduciary relationship see Hospital Prods.
Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 96-97 (Austl.) (per Mason, J.).
197. The Supreme Court of Canada has described the fiduciary relationship in this way:
From a conceptual standpoint, the fiduciary duty may properly be understood as but
one of a species of a more generalized duty by which the law seeks to protect vul-
nerable people in transactions with others ... the presence of loyalty, trust, and
confidence distinguishes the fiduciary relationship from a relationship that simply
gives rise to tortious liability.
Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 405 (Can.). It has been suggested that the follow-
ing indicia are of assistance in recognizing the existence of fiduciary relationships: (1) scope
for the exercise of some discretion or power; (2) that power or discretion can be exercised
unilaterally so as to effect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests; and (3) a peculiar vul-
nerability to the exercise of that discretion or power." Id. at 408-09.
198. G. Goodwin-Gill, Non-refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J. INT'L L.
897, 901 (1986), cited in HATHAWAY, supra note 37, at 124.
199. HATHAWAY, supra note 37, at 125.
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optimum freedom for those involved in the relationship in
question, communal or otherwise. The essence of a fiduciary
relationship, by contrast, is that one party pledges herself to act
in the best interest of the other. The fiduciary relationship has
trust, not self-interest, at its core, and when breach occurs, the
balance favours the person wronged. The freedom of the
fiduciary is diminished by the nature of the obligation he or she
has undertaken-an obligation which 'betokens loyalty, good
faith and avoidance of a conflict or duty and self-interest'.... In
short, equity is concerned, not only to compensate the plaintiff,
but to enforce the trust which is at its heart.2"
In cases involving breach of fiduciary duty, the purpose of the law is
to restore the beneficiary to the position it would have been in if the fi-
duciary had complied with its duty.2 ' Equity focuses more closely on
providing full relief to the victims; thus the liability of the defaulting
trustee/fiduciary is of a "more absolute nature."' '2 In contrast, in areas
such as tort and contract law, the law effectively engages in a balancing
exercise of allocating the burden of risk between the plaintiff and defen-
dant.03 This focus on providing remedies as opposed to limiting liability
thus provides another reason why equitable principles may provide more
assistance than common law principles.
a. Causation in Equity
It should be noted at the outset that it is difficult to provide an accu-
rate "snapshot" of causation principles in equity across common law
jurisdictions, as this area of law is evolving and has undergone changes
in recent years. Notwithstanding these changes, consideration of the tra-
ditional approach and justifications underpinning it offers assistance in
thinking about causation in the refugee context.204
200. Canson Enter. Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 543. See also Maguire
v. Makaronis, (1997) 188 C.L.R. 449, 492-93 (Austl.) (per Kirby, J.); U. S. Surgical Corp.,
156 C.L.R. at 96-97 (per Mason, J.); Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns, [1995] A.C. 421,438-
39 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.) (per Browne Wilkinson, L.J.).
201. Breen v. Williams, (1996) 186 C.L.R. 71,93 (Austl.) (per Dawson & Toohey, JJ.).
202. Commonwealth Bank of Austl. v. Smith, (1991) 102 A.L.R. 453, 480 (per Davies,
Sheppard and Gummow, JJ.). But see Pilmer v. Duke Group Ltd., (2001) 180 A.L.R. 249, 293
(Austl.) (employing equitable relief as a means of punishment rather than retribution).
203. Bendix Mintex Proprietary Ltd. v. Barnes, (1997) 42 N.S.W.L.R. 307, 317 (Austl.)
(per Mason, J.). "Nevertheless, our law remains wedded to the principle that if the risk does
not come home in a way that is causally linked to the particular defendant's negligence, then it
is the plaintiff who must bear the loss." Id.
204. This is particularly so given that recent restrictive developments have been precipi-
tated by concerns about the harshness of imposing liability on defendants, a concern not
relevant in the refugee context.
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It is clear that traditionally the element of "causation" in equity cases
such as breach of fiduciary duty was formulated far less strictly than in
cases of contract or tort. In assessing equitable compensation for breach
of fiduciary duty, it has long been held that the liability of the defaulting
fiduciary is not limited by common law principles governing legal, as
opposed to factual causation, such as the concept of novus actus inter-
veniens. °5 In a frequently cited passage, Justice Street of the New South
Wales Supreme Court explained that "causation, forseeability and re-
moteness do not readily enter into the matter" '2 6
The mere "distant nexus" required in cases of breach of fiduciary
duty is contrasted with the "close nexus" requirements inherent in cases
involving breach of contract and tortious negligence."' The classic
statement of the relevant principles in the equity context is in the deci-
sion of the Privy Council in Brickenden v. London Loan & Savings Co.,
where Lord Thankerton stated:
When a party, holding a fiduciary relationship, commits a breach
of his duty by non-disclosure of material facts, which his con-
stituent is entitled to know in connection with the transaction, he
cannot be heard to maintain that disclosure would not have al-
tered the decision to proceed with the transaction, because the
constituent's action would be solely determined by some other
factor, such as the valuation by another party of the property
proposed to be mortgaged. Once the Court has determined that
the non-disclosed facts were material, speculation as to what
205. Maguire v. Makaronis, (1997) 188 C.L.R. 449, 470 (Ausil.); Hill v. Rose, (1989)
1990 V.R. 129, 144 (Austl.) ("[T]he obligation is not limited or influenced by common law
principles governing remoteness of damage, forseeability or causation.").
206. In re Dawson, (1966) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 211. It is frequently emphasized that common
law notions of causation are not relevant. See Rose, 1990 V.R. at 149; Witten-Hannah v. Davis,
[1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. 141; Bank of N.Z. v. N.Z. Guardian Trust Co. Ltd., [ 1999] 1 N.Z.L.R. 213,
213; Smith, 102 A.L.R. at 453. See also MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 192, at 637. In Target
Holdings v. Redferns, the House of Lords reiterated that "the common law rules of remoteness
of damage and causation do not apply." [1995] A.C. 421, 434.
207. N.Z. Guardian Trust Co. Ltd., [1999] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 243 (Fisher, J.).
[Tihe 'distant nexus' approach is exemplified in trust loss cases (i.e. breaches of
trust causing loss to the trust estate), breaches of fiduciary duty, deceit, and certain
other intentional torts .... To establish even a distant nexus there must be some
causal link between breach and loss. Not required, however, are causal directness or
reasonable forseeability. Once the primary breach has been established the general
approach is to treat the claim benignly, for example by reversing the onus of prov-
ing fiduciary duty counterfactuals.
Id. at 248.
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course the constituent, on disclosure, would have taken is not
relevant.08
This test is expressed in other ways.2 9 As a Justice of the New South
Wales Court of Appeal recently explained (extra curially):
Contributory negligence has never been a defence to an action
for legal or equitable fraud. A plaintiff is entitled to relief if the
fraud was 'a cause' of the loss, even if there were more weighty
causes 'for in this field the court does not allow an examination
into the relative importance of contributory causes.' This
principle also applies to breaches of fiduciary duty.2 °
The "materiality" test has also been expressed as whether the lack of
information or misrepresentation constituted "an inducing cause,""
"a factor" 212 in the decision, or "influenced the decision" of the
beneficiary.2 3 The test has also been framed in a negative manner by
asking whether the defendant could establish that his breach of duty
"was not a factor" in the relevant decision." The test is also sometimes
described as a simple "but for" test in order to denote that mere factual
208. Brickenden v. London Loan & Sav. Co., [1934] 3 D.L.R. 465,469 (Can.) (emphasis
added). For more recent cases citing and applying this principle, see Stewart v. Layton, (1992)
111 A.L.R. 687, 713 (Austl.); Wan v. McDonald, (1992) 105 A.L.R. 473 (Austl.); Farrington v.
Rowe McBride & Partners, [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 83.
209. Although it should be noted that more often than not, courts simply reiterate the
"material" test without providing any elucidation as to its meaning.
210. K.R. Handley, Reduction of Damages Awards in FINN, ESSAYS ON DAMAGES 127
(1992) citing Barton v. Armstrong, [1976] A.C. 104, 188 (emphasis added). See also McCann
v. Switz. Ins. Austl. Ltd., (2000) 176 A.L.R. 711, 715 (Austl.) (per Gleeson, C.J.) (explaining
that a "negative answer to that question [i.e. whether there was a sufficient causal connection
between a fiduciary's dishonest act and loss] does not follow from the circumstance that there
were also dishonest or fraudulent acts of third parties which resulted in the disappearance of
the funds after they left Mr. Powles' bank account"). As to contributory negligence in equity,
see Pilmer v. Duke Group Ltd., (2001) 180 A.L.R. 249, 249.
211. SPENCER BOWER & TURNER'S ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION (3d ed. 1974)
cited in Witten-Hannah v. Davis, [1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. 141, 148 (per Richardson, J., with whom
Casey, J. agreed).
212. Haira v. Burbery Mortgage Fin. & Sav. Ltd., [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 396, 408 (per
Richardson, J., delivering judgment of the court).
213. Davis, [1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 148-50 (per Richardson, J., with whom Casey, J.
agreed). This approach is also taken by some United States Circuit Courts of Appeal in mis-
representation cases. See Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1989); Steckman & Conner,
Loss Causation Under Rule lOB-5 A Circuit-By-Circuit Analysis: When Should Representa-
tional Misconduct be deemed the cause of legal injury under the Federal Securities Laws?
1061 PLI/Corp 375 (1998). Steckman and Connor set out the most "plaintiff-friendly" test,
taken by the Eighth Circuit, which is to require only "some causal nexus" between defendant's
alleged representational misconduct and plaintiff's injury; thus, "so long as defendant's con-
duct played a role in the causal chain of events ultimately resulting in the injury, an issue of
fact will likely be deemed to exist precluding summary judgment." Id. at 466.
214. Davis, [1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 150.
[Vol. 23:265
Causation in Context
as opposed to legal causation is relevant. However, the Brickenden
approach is not a true "but for" test in the sense that the plaintiff does not
have to establish that the loss "would not have occurred but for that
conduct."
25
While the Brickenden rule remains the governing principle in some
jurisdictions, other common law courts have begun to move toward a
less onerous position (from the defendant's point of view), particularly in
the context of cases of minor or non-fraudulent breaches of fiduciary
duty, whereby the Brickenden rule operates as an evidentiary presump-
tion open to rebuttal by the defendant. 216 It is still the case however that
"the more expansive approach of equity to causation remains as the
prima facie position "'2 ' which requires a plaintiff to satisfy a "low causal
threshold" in order to enliven the presumption of liability.
2 15
The policy basis underlying the adoption of a relaxed standard of
causation in equity traditionally resulted from "a need to maintain strict
standards for fiduciaries and to avoid obfuscatory arguments as to
215. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 161, at 266.
216. This is now the position in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada. See
Canson Enters. Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 534 (Can.); Target Holdings
Ltd. v. Redferns, [1995] 1 A.C. 421, 421 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.); Bank of N.Z. v. N.Z.
Guardian Trust Co. Ltd., [1999] 1 N.Z.L.R. 213, 664. In these jurisdictions defendants are
now given the opportunity to escape liability by demonstrating that the plaintiff's loss would
have occurred irrespective of the breach. In relation to breach of fiduciary duty, "[q]uestions of
forseeability and remoteness do not arise in this kind of case either. Policy dictates that
fiduciaries be allowed only a narrow escape route from liability based on proof that the loss or
damage would have occurred even if there had been no breach." N.Z. Guardian Trust Co. Ltd.,
[1999] N.Z.L.R. at 688. The retreat appears to have begun in Redferns, adopting the minority
judgment in Canson Enters. Ltd., See also N,Z. Guardian Trust Co. Ltd., [1999] 1 N.Z.L.R. at
664. The New Zealand Court of Appeal moved toward an approach that considers "not so
much the historical source, be it equity or the common law, fiduciary duty or tort, but rather
the nature and content of the obligation which has not been fulfilled." Id. at 687 (per Tipping,
J.). See also Julie Maxton, Equity, N.Z. L. REV. 319, 330-31 (1999). For a criticism of this
approach, see Leeming, supra note 50, at 539-40. In Australia, the Brickenden rule still
applies. See Bennett v. Minister of Cmty. Welfare, (1992) 107 A.L.R. 617; Maguire v.
Makaronis, (1997) 188 C.L.R. 449, 449 (it was not necessary directly for this issue to be
considered). However, Brennan, C.J., Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow, JJ. noted that
although the application of the Brickenden rule may appear rigorous, that was not necessarily
a reason to displace the rule against delinquent fiduciaries and Kirby, J. explicitly endorsed it.
Makaronis, (1997) 188 C.L.R. at 474, 488-94. It appears that in Australia, the Brickenden test
precludes the court from considering the issue at all. See Stewart v. Layton, (1992) 111 A.L.R.
687, 687 (per Foster, J.); Gemstone Corp. of Austl. v. Grasso, (1994) 13 A.C.S.R. 695.
217. Rt. Hon. Justice Tipping, Causation at Law and in Equity: Do We Have Fusion?, 7
CANTERBURY L. REV. 443, 447 (2000).
218. Maxton, supra note 216, at 330. This is said appropriately to balance "the policy
reasons for the adoption by equity of a generous attitude to causation, with the inequity of
allowing a plaintiff to recover, if the defendant can show that the loss in suit would probably
have occurred in any event." Rt. Hon. Justice Tipping, supra note 217, at 447.
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causation of loss where fiduciaries have been found in breach. 2 9 Since
the fiduciary relationship has "trust, not self interest as its core," on
breach "the balance favours the party wronged., 220 This resonates with
the concerns of refugee law, namely, to provide maximum protection to
those in danger of persecution for Convention grounds, and to avoid
complicated and confusing arguments which erect artificial barriers to
applicants seeking asylum.
In addition to these concerns, the broad understanding of causation
in equity usefully responds to two key issues in refugee adjudication:
multiple causes and evidentiary voids. In support of the principle in
Brickenden, Justice Kirby of the Australian High Court has recently al-
luded to these issues as follows:
A purely causative approach, which relieved a defaulting fidu-
ciary of liability unless it were positively shown that such
liability was caused by the breach of fiduciary duty would have
several disadvantages. It would involve courts in the embarrass-
ing and difficult task of untangling the multiple causes of losses
which have followed an undoubted breach. Such a task would be
specially difficult where further transactions and new interests
had intervened. It would present the risk, although such breaches
were proved, of effectively sanctioning or at least ignoring the
breach by affording no relief to the beneficiary .... It is a rule
which helps to fulfill the purposes of equity, which are some-
what different from those of the common law. These include,
relevantly, ensuring the strict loyalty and good faith to benefi-
ciaries, the dutiful enforcement of obligations; the deterrence of
breaches by fiduciaries of their powers, and, where such occurs,
the ready restitution and reinstatement of the beneficiary to the
fullest extent possible. 2'
The reluctance of courts administering equity to formulate a strict
test of causation appears also to stem from a concern about the onerous
evidentiary burden that this would place upon a plaintiff. Judgments
which emphasize the danger in speculating as to what the plaintiff might
have done absent the breach of trust reflect this concern. Even where
courts have begun to move away from the strict Brickenden approach by
permitting defendants to raise the "same outcome" defense, they have
made clear that they are "not prepared to speculate" or "conjecture" as to
what would have happened had the plaintiff not suffered a breach of
219. Layton, (1992) 111 A.L.R. at 713 (per Foster, J.) citing Mouat v. Clark Boyce,
(1991) Austl. & N.Z. Conv. Rep., Issue 118, 578, 590.
220. MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 192, at 637.
221. Makaronis, (1997) 188 C.L.R. at 492 (per Kirby, J.) (emphasis added).
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fiduciary duty.22 In Haira v. Burbery Mortgage Finance & Savings Ltd.,
the New Zealand Court of Appeal concluded that "there is no
justification in the evidence for an inference that breach of duty was not
a factor in decision making." '23 To hold otherwise would be "a matter of
speculation, rather than a conclusion from the evidence" and "a matter of
conjecture, not inference.' 224 Rather, there must be a "proper evidentiary
foundation for the conclusion" which should be "cogent and should not
be lightly reached. 2
These comments demonstrate that in the equitable context courts
recognize that evidentiary voids make it difficult definitively to identify
the precise "cause" of a certain loss. Indeed, in many situations it is im-
possible to assess what might have happened given alternative
conditions. In such a case, courts have formulated broad and flexible
standards of causation, placing the overriding focus on ensuring restitu-
tion for plaintiffs. In other words, the policy basis of equity, namely
repairing breach of trust and providing "protection" for victims of breach
of trust, has led courts to develop a test of causation that favors plaintiffs
over defendants, lest "the beneficiary suffer a double disadvantage" of
enduring a breach of trust followed by a denial of protection by the
courts.
2 2 6
These concerns are particularly pertinent in the refugee context,
where a consideration of the applicant's plight absent the Convention
factor such as race or political opinion, will almost always involve a
measure of speculation. In many cases, no evidence will exist on which a
decisionmaker can base a finding as to what might be the plight of the
applicant absent the Convention ground. Given the underlying policy
concerns of the Convention and the overwhelming need to avoid re-
foulement, courts must adopt a standard of causation that is as flexible
and broad as the language of the Convention will allow.
222. See Witten-Hannah v. Davis, [1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. 141, 155 (per McKay, J.). See also
Taylor v. Schofield Peterson, [1999] 3 N.Z.L.R. 434, 445-56; Gilbert v. Shanahan Partners,
[1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 528, 535 ("To establish the point the errant fiduciary cannot invite specula-
tion."). In Hodgkinson v. Simms, the Canadian Supreme Court emphasized that "mere
'speculation' on the part of the defendant will not suffice." [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 442. See also
Wan v. McDonald, (1992) 105 A.L.R. 473, 473 (Austl.). "It is not open to [the defendant] to
evade that responsibility [to make good the loss flowing from his breach of fiduciary duty]
upon the basis of any speculation about what might afterwards have been done with the money
if it had not been lost by reason of his breach of fiduciary duty." Id. at 502. See also Palmisano
v. Hyman, No. E1353 (N.S.W. S. Ct. filed Mar. 30, 1977) (Austl.) (per Deane, J.) ("I do not
consider it any part of my function in the present matter to engage in any such speculation.")
223. Haira v. Burbery Mortgage Fin. & Sav. Ltd., [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 396, 408.
224. Id.; see also Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 441 (Can).
225. Everist v. McEvedy, [1996] 3 N.Z.L.R. 348, 355 (per Kirby, J.).
226. Makaronis, (1997) 188 C.L.R. at 493 (per Kirby, J.).
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3. Anti-Discrimination Law
The final area of law to be considered is anti-discrimination and
equality law, an area that provides a useful guide to the issue of "causa-
tion" in the refugee context since conceptually it is one of the most
analogous areas of law for a number of reasons. First, domestic anti-
discrimination legislation often incorporates or is premised on principles
of international human rights law 2.7; thus although it addresses liability
in one sense, it aims not so much to "punish" the discriminator but rather
to "protect persons against treatment which amounts to unfair discrimi-
nation,''"" to "remov[e] ... discrimination" and to "provide relief for the
victims of discrimination."229 Moreover, given its derivation or inspiration
from international human rights standards, domestic anti-discrimination
legislation is often interpreted broadly in order to give effect to its wide
societal objectives.23
227. Anti-Discrimination legislation in many jurisdictions was passed in order to comply
with obligations under international treaties such as the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter Women's Convention]. For example, the
objects of the Australian Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 include "to give effect to certain
provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women." Sex Discimination Act, 1984, § 3(a) (Austl.). In New Zealand Van Lines Ltd. v. Pro-
ceedings Comm'r, [1995] I N.Z.L.R. 100, 102 (per Smellie, J.), the High Court of New
Zealand explained that the Human Rights Commission Act of 1977 "together with the Race
Relations Act 1971, and the recently enacted Human Rights Act 1993 'all sit within a broad
international human rights framework.' They were enacted in part to comply with New Zea-
land's international obligations pursuant to certain covenants and ratifications." See also North
Reg'l Health Auth. v. Human Rights Comm'n, [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R 218.
228. City Council of Pretoria v. Walker, 1998 (3) BCLR 257, para. 43 (CC).
229. Ontario Human Rights Comm'n & Therese O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears Ltd.,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 547 (Can.). See also 1W v. City of Perth, (1997) 191 C.L.R. 1, 58-59
(Austl.) (per Kirby, J.). The British Race Relations Board (as it then was) summarized the role
of anti-discrimination legislation in its first annual report which included "providing protec-
tion and redress to minority groups." MARTIN MACEWEN, TACKLING RACISM IN EUROPE: AN
EXAMINATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN PRACTICE, 27-28 (1995).
230. In the anti-discrimination context, it is repeatedly emphasized in many jurisdictions
that anti-discrimination legislation should be interpreted so as to give effect to the "special
nature and purpose of the enactment ... and give to it an interpretation which will advance its
broad purposes." Ontario Human Rights Comm'n & Therese O'Malley, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at
546-47. See generally City of Perth, (1997) 191 C.L.R. at 12 (per Brennan, C.J. & McHugh,
J.), 22-23 (per Dawson & Gaudron, JJ.), 26-27 (per Toohey, J.), 39 (per Gummow, J.), 58-59
(per Kirby, J.); Waters v. Pub. Transp. Corp., (1992) 173 C.L.R. 349, 359-60 (Austl.); North
Reg'l Health Auth., [1998] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 218; Coburn v. Human Rights Comm'n, [1994] 3
N.Z.L.R. 323, 333 (per Thorp, J.) ("The proper construction of both sections requires an ap-
propriate regard for the substantial body of authority, both in New Zealand and abroad, as to
the special character of human rights legislation and the need to accord it a fair, large and
liberal interpretation, rather than a literal or technical one"). In New Zealand Van Lines Ltd.,
the High Court emphasized that "it is clear that legislation of this kind is to be accorded a
liberal and enabling interpretation." [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 103 (per Smellie, J.). It should be
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Second, the language of anti-discrimination law echoes that in the
Refugee Convention. Legislation prohibiting discrimination usually ex-
presses concern with discrimination "on the ground of," "on the basis
of," "by reason of, or "because of" certain enumerated grounds or rea-
sons.
Third, where issues of multiple causes arise in anti-discrimination
law, they tend more closely to resemble the types of inquiries in refugee
law than does the "multiple cause" issue in tort law. In other words,
rather than dealing with multiple independent causes, anti-discrimination
law often requires an adjudicator to divine the reason why a single per-
son or organization acted in a particular way-a difficult task because,
just as in the refugee context, it involves dealing with "a tangle of human
motivations, which are not truly independent or separable."23'
a. Causation in Anti-Discrimination Law
Different theories of establishing discrimination exist in many juris-
dictions, the most obvious being the distinction between direct
discrimination or disparate treatment and indirect discrimination or dis-
parate impact."' Direct discrimination involves a policy that is
discriminatory on its face or an action taken according to a discrimina-
tory criterion whereas indirect discrimination involves a facially neutral
standard or condition that discriminates in effect or impact.233 The ques-
tion of "causation," that is, the question whether the predicament of the
applicant/plaintiff is a result of discriminatory treatment, usually arises
in cases involving direct discrimination, where the question is whether a
difference in treatment is on the ground of, basis of, or by reason of dis-
crimination on one of an enumerated list of prohibited grounds.3
It is clear that in all common law jurisdictions considered for the
purpose of this Article, courts and legislatures have rejected the notion
that a prohibited ground must be the sole ground for the relevant
noted however that some courts are more willing than others to give precedence to the policy
objectives of equality legislation and generally speaking, the United States Supreme Court,
has been less willing to do so.
231. Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court's
-Rhetoric and Its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV.
1,21 (1998).
232. This mirrors the definition of discrimination in international human rights instru-
ments that refer to purpose or effect of a discriminatory act. See, e.g., Women's Convention,
supra note 227, art. I, at 13. I note, however, that the Canadian Supreme Court has now abol-
ished this distinction in interpreting anti-discrimination legislation. See B.C. Gov't & Serv.
Employees' Union v. B.C. Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Comm'n, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
233. See, e.g., Women's Convention, supra note 227, at 15.
234. This is because in indirect discrimination cases, the proof that a neutral policy dis-
proportionately impacts on a protected group automatically deals with the "causation" issue.
The analysis then turns to a consideration of whether the policy is justified.
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action. 235 Further, although the relevant test is sometimes framed by ref-
erence to the "but for" test, courts have more often than not rejected it as
presenting too high a barrier for applicants to satisfy, 36 particularly in the
context of cases involving mixed motives.237 Moreover, even where it is
adopted, it is important to understand the context in which it is applied.
For example, while the United Kingdom is one of the few jurisdictions
explicitly and clearly to rely upon the "but for" test in determining cau-
sation in the discrimination context,"' it is important to consider the
background against which this test has been developed. Significantly, the
courts and legislatures of many common law countries (excluding the
United States239) have rejected a subjective test of intention, even in cases
of disparate treatment or direct discrimination,2 ° in favor of an objective
assessment of whether the treatment suffered by the applicant can be
explained by reference to a discriminatory policy or act. This involves a
235. The jurisdictions considered were: United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. See Human Rights Comm'n v. Eric Sides Motors,
[ 1981] 2 N.Z.A.R. 447, 456-57; Ontario Human Rights Comm 'n & Therese 0 'Malley, [ 1985]
2 S.C.R. at 536; Owen & Briggs v. James, [1995] I.R.L.R. 87 (C.A.) (Eng.). The rejection of
the "sole cause" approach is evident in cases discussing mixed motives. See infra notes 247-
71.
236. See, for example, Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983), where then-
Judge Scalia wrote "[iut is unreasonable and destructive of the purposes of Title VII to require
the plaintiff to establish in addition [to the fact that unlawful discrimination has been applied
against him], the difficult hypothetical proposition that, had there been no discrimination, the
employment decision would have been made in his favor." Id. at 1366. See also Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989) discussed below at notes 252-55. The "but for"
test has also been rejected in Canadian anti-discrimination law. In Holloway v. MacDonald,
(1983) 4 C.H.R.R. D/1454 para. 12481, the British Columbia Board of Inquiry explained that,
pursuant to the British Columbia Human Rights Code, "if the decision was in fact influenced
by membership in the group, I do not believe it would be a defence that a hypothetical em-
ployer might have made the same determination solely on the basis of permissible factors,
though the existence of such factors might sometimes be relevant to the issue of damages."
237. See, e.g., Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 228.
238. See James v. Eastleigh Borough Council, [1990] 2 A.C. 751 (Eng.); R. v. Birming-
ham City Council, [1989] A.C. 1155 (Eng.). It has also been said that the European Court of
Justice adopts a "but for" test in the same objective sense. See also COLIN BOURN & JOHN
WHITMORE, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN BRITAIN 43 (1996); Dekker v. Stichting Vorm-
ingscentrum Voor Jonge Volwassen, (1990) I.R.L.R. 27 (Eng.),
239. The United States was the only jurisdiction located in undertaking this research
which requires intent in disparate treatment cases. In the context of discrimination claims
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this has long been the key requirement
for a successful discrimination claim. In Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical." 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
See also Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
240. Of course in cases of indirect discrimination or disparate impact, intent is not rele-
vant since the question is the impact or effect of a neutral policy or condition. Even in the
United States it is recognized that Title VII permits an action to be bought under the theory of
disparate impact, an action that does not require the plaintiff to prove the intent of the defen-
dant. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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rejection of the necessity for the plaintiff to prove an intent to discrimi-
nate or the existence of subjective elements such as racism or sexism on
the part of the perpetrator of the relevant treatment.24' Thus, although
consideration of subjective material such as the intention of the defen-
dant may be appropriate and relevant as evidence of discrimination, it is
not a necessary element of a successful discrimination claim.2  It has
been said that although "[t]here is some force" in the argument that ex-
pressions such as "on the ground of" look to an intent or motive on the
part of the alleged discriminator that is related to the protected status of
the other person,2 3 to require the plaintiff to establish an intent to dis-
criminate would "significantly impede or hinder the attainment of the
objects of" anti-discrimination legislation 2" and would "subvert the
achievement of the purposes of the Act., 241 It is in this context that the
British House of Lords has referred to the "but for" test as the appropri-
ate criterion in discrimination cases in order to denote that the test is
objective and not subjective. In R. v. Birmingham City Council, ex parte
241. This is the position in Canada, Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.
See Waters v. Pub. Transp. Corp., (1992) 173 C.L.R. 349 (Austl.); Ontario Human Rights
Comm'n &Therese O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears Ltd., [198512 S.C.R. 536,547; James, (1990)
2 A.C. at 751; Birmingham City Council, [1989] A.C. at 1155; City Council of Pretoria v.
Walker, 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC). It is worth noting that some legislatures in Australia have
specifically provided that motive is not vital to establishing discrimination. See Equal Oppor-
tunity Act, 1995 § 10 (Vic.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1992 § 20(4) (NT). See also CHRIS
RONALDS, DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 32-33 (1998) (discussing HR&EO Comm'n
v. Mount Isa Mines Ltd., (1993) 118 A.L.R. 80 (per Lockhart, J.)).
242. See RONALDS, supra note 241, at 32-33.
243. Waters, (1992) 173 C.L.R. at 359 (per Mason, C.J. & Gaudron, J.).
244. See id. (per Mason, CJ. & Gaudron, J.).
245. 1W v. City of Perth, (1997) 191 C.L.R. 1,40 (per Gummow, J.). Indeed, in Ontario
Human Rights Comm'n & Therese O'Malley, Justice McIntyre of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada explained, in the context of interpreting the Canadian Human Rights Code, that:
To take the narrower view and hold that intent is a required element of discrimina-
tion under the Code would seem to me to place a virtually insuperable barrier in the
way of a complainant seeking a remedy .... Furthermore, as I have endeavored to
show, we are dealing here with consequences of conduct rather than with punish-
ment for misbehaviour. In other words, we are considering what are essentially civil
remedies. The proof of intent, a necessary requirement in our approach to criminal
and punitive legislation, should not be a governing factor in construing human
rights legislation aimed at the elimination of discrimination.
It is my view that the courts below were in error in finding an intent to discriminate
to be a necessary element of proof.
Ontario Human Rights Comm'n & Therese O'Malley, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 549-50 (emphasis
added). See also Brooks v. Canadian Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219. This reasoning has
also been applied in the context of the equality guarantee contained in § 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. For example, in Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia, Justice McIntyre defined discrimination as "whether intentional or not." [1989] 1
S.C.R. 143, 144. See also B.C. Gov't & Serv. Employees' Union v. B.C. Pub. Serv. Employee
Relations Comm'n, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3.
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Equal Opportunities Commission,246 Lord Goff explained that the "inten-
tion or motive of the defendant to discriminate, though it may be relevant
so far as remedies are concerned ... is not a necessary condition to li-
ability. It is perfectly possible to envisage cases where the defendant had
no such motive, and yet did in fact discriminate on the grounds of sex. 247
Considering this approach in a subsequent decision, Lord Bridge of
Harwich explained that Lord Goff's test "is not subjective, but objective"
and "[a]dopting it here the question becomes: would the plaintiff, a man
of 61, have received the same treatment as his wife but for his sex?
248
Indeed the House of Lords envisaged that phrasing the relevant inquiry
by reference to this objective "but for" test would produce clarity and
remove the conflation of causation, intention and motive that frequently
occurs in this context. As Lord Goff explained in James, the "simple" but
for test,
possesses the double virtue that, on the one hand, it embraces
both the case where the treatment derives from the application of
a gender-based criterion, and the case where it derives from the
selection of the complainant because of his or her sex and on the
other hand it avoids, in most cases at least, complicated ques-
tions relating to concepts such as intention, motive, reason or
purpose, and the danger of confusion arising from the misuse of
those elusive terms. 9
Yet even in those jurisdictions that do refer to the "but for" formula-
tion, courts have nonetheless capitulated to criticisms that it can present
an overly onerous standard to applicants, particularly in the context of
mixed grounds or motives, and have thus developed alternative formula-
tions to accommodate these difficulties. 5° In other words, courts,
246. [1989] A.C. 1155 (H.L. 1989).
247. Id. at 1193-94.
248. James v. Eastleigh Borough Council, [1990] 2 A.C. 751, 765 (H.L. 1990). I note
that judges in other jurisdictions have appreciated that this is the significance of the applica-
tion of the "but for" test in James. See, e.g., City of Perth, (1997) 191 C.L.R. at 21 (per
Toohey, J.).
249. James, [1990] 2A.C. at 774.
250. Justice Brennan writing for the plurality, refers to the classic problem of the "but
for" test in the mixed motives example as follows:
Suppose two physical forces act upon and move an object, and suppose that either
force acting alone would have moved the object. As the dissent would have it, nei-
ther physical force was a 'cause' of the motion unless we can show that but for one
or both of them, the object would not have moved; apparently both forces were
simply 'in the air' unless we can identify at least one of them as a but-for cause of
the object's movement. Events that are causally over determined, in other words,
may not have any cause at all. This cannot be so.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
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including those in the United Kingdom, have acknowledged that failure
to satisfy the "but for" test does not automatically preclude a successful
discrimination claim. 25' In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, four justices of
the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected the "but for" test in
the context of "mixed motives" cases.252 Justice Brennan (for the plural-
ity) stated that, "[t]o construe the words 'because of' as colloquial
shorthand for 'but-for causation' ... is to misunderstand them." He fur-
ther explained:
We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we
interpret a statute. It is difficult for us to imagine that, in the
simple words 'because of,' Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff
to identify the precise causal role played by legitimate and ille-
gitimate motivations in the employment decision she challenges.
We conclude, instead, that Congress meant to obligate her to
prove that the employer relied upon sex-based considerations in
coming to its decision.253
His Honor explained that while the phrase "but for" had been en-
gaged in previous decisions, it was not intended to suggest that the
plaintiff must show but-for cause, merely that if she does so, she pre-
vails. Ultimately his Honor preferred to characterize the test as
whether the prohibited ground was a motivating factor, a test now em-
bodied in Title VII by virtue of the passage of the Civil Rights Act
1991255 and also consistent with that adopted by the Supreme Court in
cases under the Fourteenth Amendment.256
251. Indeed in James, Lord Goff explained that the "but for" test was also not appropri-
ate for cases of indirect discrimination, "because there may be indirect discrimination against
persons of one sex under that subsection, although a (proportionately smaller) group of per-
sons of the opposite sex is adversely affected in the same way." [1990] 2 A.C. at 774. In mixed
motives cases in the United Kingdom, tests such as "important factor" have been adopted. See
infra note 257.
252. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 228. Note that the "but for" test was rejected in the plurality
opinion of Justice Brennan in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice
White concurred although declined to enter into "semantic discussions" about whether the test
was properly described as a "but for" test, preferring the formulation "substantial factor." Id. at
258. Justice O'Connor also concurred although explicitly equated the "substantial factor" test
with a "but for" test. Id. at 261.
253. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
254. Id. at 240.
255. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION 186 (5th ed. 2000). It is not clear whether it applies to cases brought under
§ 1981 or the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA). See id. at 189.
256. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Co., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977),
(holding that "[p]roof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially dis-
criminatory purpose would ... have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the
same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been consid-
ered.").
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The question of the requisite causal link between a prohibited
ground and the ultimate treatment or outcome has usually arisen and is
therefore more closely analyzed in cases involving mixed motives or rea-
sons for a particular decision. Three possible approaches can be
identified in the case law, although they are not mutually exclusive.
First, some courts have attempted to articulate the degree of rele-
vance that the prohibited ground must have to the ultimate decision. As a
result, they have asked whether the protected reason or ground was an
"important factor" in the decision, 257 an "effective and predominant
cause,"258 the "real and efficient cause,' 25 9 a "motivating factor,"26° "a
substantial factor,"26 ' a "substantial and operative factor"262 or "a substan-
tive reason in the totality of reasons. '263  Courts often use tests
interchangeably and rarely analyze them in terms of a hierarchy of degree
of proof, although it is often emphasized that the tests do not suggest that
the prohibited factor must be the only or even the main cause.26 However,
confusion exists as to what standard is conveyed by the use of a particular
term. For example, courts have used the terms "motivating factor" and
"one of th[e] reasons" interchangeably, notwithstanding the fact that those
two phrases do not appear to posit the same test.265
The second method eschews the "jurisprudence of adjectives''266 ap-
proach outlined above, and instead adopts a simple and uncomplicated
257. This is the position taken in the United Kingdom. See O'Neill v. Governors of St
Thomas More RCVA Upper School, [1996] I.R.L.R. 372 (Eng.); Nagarajan v. Agnew, [1994]
I.R.L.R. 61 (Eng.). Interestingly, this test is elucidated against the background of the "but for"
test and it is clear that the English courts consider that they are consistent, although little
analysis is undertaken of this issue, since the "but for" test is not usually referred to in "mixed
motives" cases.
258. O'Neill, [1996 I.R.L.R. at 372.
259. Id.
260. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1989). Indeed, following this de-
cision, Congress amended Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which provides that an
unlawful employment practice is established when the plaintiff demonstrates that the prohib-
ited ground was a motivating factor for the employment practice. The adoption of Justice
Brennan's approach presumably involves a concomitant rejection of the "but for" test, at least
in mixed motives cases.
261. Id. at 258. See also NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401 (1983).
262. Human Rights Comm'n v. Eric Sides Motors, [1981] 2 N.Z.A.R. 447,457.
263. Id.
264. See O'Neill, [1996] I.R.L.R. at 377; Fuller v. Candur Plastics Ltd., (Review Tribu-
nal) [1981] 2 C.H.R.R. D/419 (Can.).
265. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 248.
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean
that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were
and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the appli-
cant or employee was a woman.
Id.
266. Starcon, Inc. v. NLRB, 176 F.3d 948, 951 (7th Cir. 1999).
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test of whether the prohibited ground is "one of the reasons" for the rele-
vant decision.2 " This is the approach adopted in interpreting anti-
discrimination legislation in Canada and Australia. In Canada, plaintiffs
can prove discrimination under federal and provincial Human Rights
Codes268 if the prohibited ground "affected the employer's decision ' 269 or
"was one of the factors that influenced the respondent in refusing the
applicant the position; it does not have to be the sole or primary reason
for that decision., 270 The Federal Court of Canada takes the view that "it
is sufficient that the discrimination be a basis for the employer's deci-
sion. 271 Concomitant with this straightforward approach is a rejection of
an inquiry that sets up a "false dichotomy" between permissible and im-
permissible factors. 72
This simple test has not prevented different tribunals from express-
ing the test in a variety of ways; for example as "operative factor or
proximate cause,' , 211 "an operative [but not major] element,' '274 "the effec-
tive cause, 271 "a material cause, that is, a proximate cause, one that
played a part even if subconsciously and even if present with other
causes,'"276 and even "the straw that broke the camel's back.277 However,
despite the different formulations, the Canadian Federal Court consis-
tently takes the view that although the "verbal formulations" vary, the
overriding test is whether the prohibited factor was "one of the factors in
the decision. 278
This "one factor" test appears the least demanding test in the anti-
discrimination field and it is also the approach adopted in Australian
state and federal anti-discrimination law. For example, Section 18 of the
267. See lancu v. Simcoe County Bd. of Educ., (Review Tribunal) [1983] 4 C.H.R.R.
D/1203, D/1207 (B.C. Human Rights Council Dec.).
268. For an explanation of the structure and application of human rights legislation in
Canada, see RUSSELL W. ZINN AND PATRICIA BRETHOUR, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CANADA: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1-1 (2000).
269. McKee v. Hayes-Dana Inc., [1992] 17 C.H.R.R. D/79, D/80 5 (Can.).
270. Toth v. Sassy Cuts, Inc., (Review Tribunal) [1987] 8 C.H.R.R. D/4376, D/4377
(Can.).
271. Holden v. Canadian Nat'l Railway Co., [1990] 14 C.H.R.R. D/12 at *8 (Fed. Ct. of
Can., App. Div.) (emphasis added).
272. Holloway v. MacDonald, [1983] 4 C.H.R.R. D/1454 para. 12482 (Can.).
273. Taylor vVia Sec. Sys., Inc., (Review Tribunal) [1987] 8 C.H.R.R. D/3925, D/3930
(Can.).
274. Fuller v. Candur Plastics Ltd., (Review Tribunal) [1981] 2 C.H.R.R. D/419, D/420
(Can.).
275. Holloway, [1983] 4 C.H.R.R. D/1454 para. 12483.
276. Hendry v. Liquour Control Bd. of Ontario, [1980] 1 C.H.R.R. D/160 para. 1458
(Can.).
277. Holloway, [1983] 4 C.H.R.R. D/1454 para. 12483.
278. Holden v. Canadian Nat'l Railway Co., [1990] 14 C.H.R.R. D/12 (Fed. Ct of Can.,
App. Div.); Canada (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Canada (Dep't of Nat'l Health & Welfare),
[1998] 32 C.H.R.R. D/168, aff d, [1999] 41 C.C.E.L. (2d) 3, 160 F.T.R. 287.
Winter 2002]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) provides that where an act is done
for two or more reasons, and one of the reasons is the race, color, de-
scent, or national or ethnic origin of a person (regardless of whether it is
the dominant reason or a substantial reason for doing the act) then the
act is considered to have been done for that "protected" reason. Similar
provisions appear in many anti-discrimination statutes in Australia and
were enacted due to controversy in the early case law regarding the ques-
tion whether the relevant act had to be the only reason, a substantial or
dominant reason, or just "a reason. 27 9 Clearly this uncertainty has now
been resolved in favor of a simple and straightforward "one factor"
test.28° Of course, courts continue to emphasize that a causal relationship
must be established in order for plaintiffs to succeed, 28' however the fac-
tual inquiry is simplified by the lowering of the standard of causation.
The third approach to an analysis of causation in anti-discrimination
law is applied in some jurisdictions as an alternative to (and sometimes
in conjunction with) the "important factor" or "one factor" approaches
279. See Sex Discrimination Act, 1984, § 8 (Austl.). See also Disability Discrimination
Act, 1992, § 10 (Austl.); Equal Opportunity Act, 1984, § 5 (W. Austl.); Anti-Discrimination
Act, 1977, § 4A (N.S.W. Austl.). RONALDS, supra note 241, at 42. A consideration of cases
applying this legislation reveals that overall the test is applied in a very uncomplicated and
straightforward manner. Generally courts and tribunals appear to have little difficulty in under-
standing and applying this test, although see IW v. City of Perth, (1997) 191 C.L.R. 1, 64-65
(per Kirby, J.). Cf. Comm'r of Corrective Servs. v. Aldridge, (2000) NSWADTAP 5 para. 52-
53.
280. 1 note that in IW v. City of Perth, (1997) 191 C.L.R. at 64, Kirby, J. thought that the
"but for" test adopted by the House of Lords in James v. Eastleigh Borough Council, [1990] 2
A.C. 75 1, was appropriate in the context of Sec. 5 of the WA legislation which provides the
equivalent provision to Sec. 18 of the RDA. His Honour thought that this test "must be applied
keeping § 5 of the Act in mind." However, the two cases cited by his Honour are not authorita-
tive as one was decided prior to the relevant legislative amendment. See Australian Iron and
Steel Ltd. v. Banovic, (1989) 168 C.L.R. 165 (concerning NSW legislation; Sec. 4A was in-
serted into the NSW legislation in 1994). The other case cited the House of Lords approach as
authority for the objective approach. See Waters v. Pub. Transp. Corp., (1992) 173 C.L.R. 349,
359-60 (Austl.) (concerning Victorian legislation which does not explicitly contain the "one
factor" test.). Moreover, this view has been criticized in other contexts. In Commissioner of
Corrective Services v. Aldridge, (2000) NSWADTAP 5 para. 5, the New South Wales Adminis-
trative Decisions Tribunal Appeal Panel noted that Sec. 4A of the New South Wales (NSW)
legislation, embodying the "one factor" test, "throws doubt on the usefulness in NSW of the
'but for' test of causation in cases of direct discrimination" as it "may distort the meaning of
section 4A." Indeed it was stated that the one factor test set out in Sec. 4A
is inconsistent with the 'but for' test which requires the complainant to prove that
the less favourable treatment would not have occurred without the presence of that
ground or reason. Section 4A only requires the complainant to prove that the pro-
scribed ground or reason was one of the factors which contributed to the less
favourable treatment. These tests are, in our view, inconsistent.
Id. This, with respect, is plainly correct.
281. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Austl. v. Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Comm'n,
(1997) 147 A.L.R. 469.
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and involves an evidentiary burden-shifting technique whereby the bur-
den of proof shifts between the plaintiff and defendant once the applicant
has established a prima facie case. In this way, proof that the prohibited
ground is "a factor" would establish either a prima facie case or an actual
violation. The responsibility would then shift to the defendant to estab-
lish that the prohibited ground had been irrelevant to the decision or
action taken. The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted this approach in
"mixed motives" cases in the field of employment discrimination law.
This approach requires the plaintiff initially to establish that the prohib-
ited ground was a "motivating factor" in the decision. Once established,
the defendant can escape liability only by showing that, even if it had not
taken the relevant factor into account, it would have come to the same
decision.282 A similar, although even more "plaintiff friendly," approach
has been adopted in a European Community Directive on the burden of
proof in discrimination cases... and in South Africa's recently enacted
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of
2000.284
The "burden-shifting" approach attempts to strike a balance between
the need to avoid an overly onerous standard from the plaintiff's point of
view and the need to ensure a sufficiently minimum level of causation.
Moreover, it reflects overriding concerns of fairness; that is, that the bur-
den of proof should be placed on the defendant because the defendant's
actions have created the problem of proof.
285
282. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). Interestingly, following the
passage of the Civil Rights Act in the United States, the proof of a prohibited ground as a
"motivating factor" establishes liability and it is only the remedy that is affected by the em-
ployer's "same decision" defense. Following Hopkins, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 enacted a
new Sec. 703(m) providing that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivat-
ing factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice"
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (1991). Where the plaintiff establishes a motivating factor, a viola-
tion of the statute is made out. However, the employer may limit a plaintiff's remedies if it can
demonstrate that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor." ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 255, at 183-84.
283. Council Directive 97/80/EC, art. 4.1, 1998 O.J. (L 14/6) requires Member States to
ensure that, in proceedings alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment, once the appli-
cant has established facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct (or
indirect) discrimination, it shall be for the respondent "to prove that there has been no breach
of the principle of equal treatment." See Jenifer Ross, The Burden of Proving Discrimination,
4 INT'L J. OF DISCRIMINATION & L. 95, 101 (2000).
284. Section 13 provides that if the complainant makes out a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, the respondent must prove "that the discrimination did not take place as alleged"
or "that the conduct is not based on one or more of the prohibited grounds"; the defendant also
has the onus of establishing that if discrimination did take place it was not unfair. Promotion
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000 § 13(2).
285. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379 (5th Cir.
1974) ("Unquestionably, it is now impossible for an individual discriminatee to recreate the
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Theoretically, refugee decisionmaking is not adversarial in the tradi-
tional sense since the burden of proof is "shared" between the applicant
and decisionmaker.16 However, in practice many states' determination
procedures operate along adversarial lines. To the extent that this is so,
the idea of burden shifting may, at first blush, appear relevant to refugee
law in the context of determining causation. However a closer considera-
tion suggests that it is not appropriate since it would likely introduce a
rigid and legalistic proof structure into decisionmaking and (more impor-
tantly) does not have the same logical force as in the discrimination
context, given that the party to whom the burden would shift (the gov-
ernment of the country in which the applicant is seeking asylum) is not
in the same superior evidentiary position vis-A-vis motive as are defen-
dants in discrimination cases.
A number of rationales exist for adopting relaxed standards of causa-
tion in the anti-discrimination context, relating to both policy issues and
pragmatic concerns. First, a liberal causation standard is often thought to
be important given the overriding policy concerns of human rights legis-
lation, namely, eradicating discriminatory conduct in any form. For
example, in the context of the relevant federal legislation in the United
States, it has been said, "in the implementation of employment deci-
sions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no ... discrimination,
subtle or otherwise.""' Since anti-discrimination legislation aims to
past with exactitude."). Johnson's holding was adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Such a showing
is impossible precisely because of the employer's unlawful action; it is only equitable that any
resulting uncertainty be resolved against the party whose action gave rise to the problem.").
See also Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 272.
Many of these [lower] courts, which deal with the evidentiary issues in Title VII
cases on a regular basis, have concluded that placing the risk of nonpersuasion on
the defendant in a situation where uncertainty as to causation has been created by
its consideration of an illegitimate criterion makes sense as a rule of evidence and
furthers the substantive command of Title VII.
Id.
286. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CON-
VENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 196 (1979)
("Thus, while the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and
evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in
some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at his disposal to produce the
necessary evidence in support of the application.").
287. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 272 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
801). Some early United States court decisions that favoured a lenient causation standard took
the view that
[C]laims of racial discrimination and retaliation are not to be viewed in terms of the
degree to which they might or might not have been a factor in challenged actions
and must instead be viewed by the Court in terms of whether they played any part at
all in such actions. If any element of racial discrimination or retaliation or reprisal
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"provide relief for the victims 2 9 and to achieve "the vindication of a
major public interest"289 including the removal of the stigmatic harm of
discrimination,29° courts and legislatures display a willingness to relax
the causation standard in order to facilitate the achievement of the aims
of the legislation."' As one Canadian tribunal expressed it, "the declared
purpose of the Act can be better accomplished by the much less involved
method of determining merely whether a prohibited reason formed part
of the reasons for the decision., 292 Indeed, the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination, the international body vested with the
duty to oversee the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 293 by state parties, has criticized state
legislation that confines the prohibition of discrimination to those actions
undertaken solely on the basis of race, questioning the legitimacy of
such a narrow test in light of the object and purposes of the Conven-
• 294
tion. An overly constrictive test is said to "considerably weaken the
played any part in a challenged action, no matter how remote or slight or tangential,
the Court would hold that the challenged action was in violation of... the law.
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 6 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases 1328, 1330 (N.D. Ala. 1973). See
also King v. Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am., Union Local No. 818, 443 F.2d 273 (6th Cir.
1971). However, I note that the causation issue in U.S. employment discrimation law is still
contested, and in many respects unclear. See, for example, supra, note 252. There is contro-
versy about the nature of the evidence that is required in order to take advantage of the lenient
"motivating factor" test. See Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell
Douglas Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title
VII, 87 CAL. L. REV. 983 (1999); Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discri-
mation Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651 (2000).
288. Ontario Human Rights Comm'n & Therese O'Malley v. Simpson-Sears Ltd.,
[198512 S.C.R. 536, 547 (Can.); Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.).
289. In the context of United States legislation, it has been said that "claims under Title
VII involve the vindication of a major public interest." Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R.
1746, Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 Conference Report, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7168 (1972),
quoted in Brodin, supra note 175, at 319.
290. In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, for
example, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "whatever the final out-
come of a decisional process, the inclusion of race or sex as a consideration within it harms
both society and the individual." Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 263. See also City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
291. The broad, purposive approach to interpreting anti-discrimination legislation is rec-
ognized in most regimes. See supra notes 227-30. For example, in one of the key Canadian
decisions setting out the "one factor" test, the Board of Inquiry emphasized that "the primary
objective of the Human Rights Code is to provide equality of opportunity. The objective is to
ensure that people are judged as individuals rather than on the basis of preconceptions about
groups to which they belong." Holloway v. MacDonald, [1983] 4 C.H.R.R. D/1454 para.
12493 (Can.).
292. Holloway, [1983] 4 C.H.R.R. D/1454, para. 12485.
293. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note
227.
294. The two states that have been subject to such criticism are Austria and the Nether-
lands.
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scope of the Convention. 295 Interestingly, the Committee has suggested
that the Australian example of adopting a "one factor" test might be con-
sidered as a model for state parties that are required to modify existing
sole factor tests in order to comply with their obligations under CERD.296
A second rationale for adopting the "one factor" test reflects the dif-
ficulty and artificiality of separating prohibited from non-prohibited
factors when ascertaining the determinant of an act. As Justice Kirby of
the High Court of Australia has explained:
That purpose [of legislation similar to s18 of the Racial Dis-
crimination Act] is plain enough. It involves a recognition of the
fact that, typically, human motivation is complex. Discrimina-
tory conduct can rarely be ascribed to a single 'reason' or
'ground'.... The object of the Act is to exclude the unlawful
and discriminatory reasons from the relevant conduct. This is
because such reasons can infect that conduct with prejudice and
irrelevant or irrational considerations which the Act is designed
to prevent. Because persons, faced with allegations of discrimi-
nation, genuinely or otherwise, assert multiple and complex
reasons-and because affirmative proof of an unlawful reason is
often difficult-the Act has simplified the task for the decision-
maker. It is enough that it be shown that the doing of the act was
'by reason' or 'on the ground' of the particular matter in the
sense that the unlawful consideration was included in the alleged
discriminator's reasons or grounds. It must be a real 'reason' or
'ground.' It is not enough to show that it was a trivial or insub-
stantial one. But once it is shown that the unlawful consideration
295. Consideration of Ninth and Tenth Periodic Reports of Austria, Comm. on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination, 41 st Sess., Provisional Summary Record of the 947th mtg. at
3, U.N. Doc. CERD/C.SR.947 (Sept. 9, 1992) (The Committee was referring to Article I of
Austria's Federal Constitutional Law of 1973, "which prohibited any discrimination on the
sole ground of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin."). Concluding Observations
of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Austria, Comm. on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add. 64, at % 11 (Apr. 7,
1999) (The Committee recommended that "the State party consider amending the relevant
provision in the Constitution Act implementing the Convention by deleting the word 'sole' in
connection with the basis of illegal racial distinctions."). The Committee has also criticized a
similar provision in Sec. 5 of the Equal Treatment Act of the Netherlands, stating: "The
wording 'on the sole grounds of' various types of discrimination lent itself to a restrictive
interpretation since unequal treatment often occurred on both permissible and prohibited
grounds and might be justified by the discriminating party on the former grounds." Summary
Records of the 1252nd Meeting: Netherlands, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation, 52d Sess., 1252d mtg., U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR.1252 at 46, (Mar. 10, 1998).
296. See Consideration of Ninth and Tenth Periodic Reports of Austria, supra note 295,
[Vol. 23:265
Causation in Context
truly played a causative part in the decision of the alleged dis-
criminator, that is sufficient to attract a remedy under the Act.297
This is particularly the case when attempting to analyze the motiva-
tions of an organization or bureaucratic structure such as a governmental
body. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the context
of a claim under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, "[r]arely can it be said that a legislative or administrative body
operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a
single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or
'primary' one. ' '
A third and closely related rationale for the "one factor" standard re-
lates to the evidentiary difficulties complainants face in anti-
discrimination actions. This has been acknowledged by both legislatures
and courts. For example, in a recent decision of the Federal Court of
Canada, Justice Richard explained the "one factor" test as appropriate
since, "I cannot categorically say that Mr. Basi would have received the
position but for the discrimination; however I can say that the circum-
stantial evidence satisfies me that discrimination played a part in the
employer's failure to offer it to him."299 Indeed, the existence of eviden-
tiary difficulties facing complainants was a major rationale for the
introduction of the "one factor" test in Australian anti-discrimination
legislation 3°° and has been pointed to by the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination as a significant problem with anti-
discrimination legislation that restricts its purview to action undertaken
on the sole ground of race. TM
297. IW v. City of Perth, (1997) 191 C.L.R. 1, 63 (emphasis added).
298. See Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Co., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
299. Canada (Human Rights Comm'n) v. Canada (Dep't of Nat'l Health & Welfare),
[1998] 32 C.H.R.R. D/168 at 5-6, affd, [1999] 41 C.C.E.L. (2d) 3, 160 F.T.R. 287.
300. See Australia's Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports Submitted under Article 9 of
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc. CERD/C/194/Add.2, at 11 (June 19, 1991) (stat-
ing that, "[t]he adjustments remove the requirements that racial discrimination be shown to be
the dominant reason for an action in order for that action to be unlawful. This provision pre-
sented a significant range of complainants with problems of proof.").
301. Country Rapporteur, Mr Nobel, said in response to a question about the appropri-
ateness of the Committee's commenting on such details as the use of the word "sole" in the
Federal Constitution Act, "that the inclusion of the word 'sole' made it difficult for complain-
ants against racism in legislative and administrative acts to litigate successfully." Summary
Record of the 1327th meeting: Austria, Mongolia, Portugal, Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, 54th Sess., 1327th mtg., U.N. Doc. 22/03/99 CERD/C/SR.1327, 66-
68 (Mar. 22, 1999).
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b. Tentative Conclusions From Anti-Discrimination Law
This analysis suggests that where the law is concerned with eradicat-
ing discriminatory conduct and providing protection and redress for
victims, a liberal and straightforward test of causation is deemed prefer-
able. Courts and legislatures have acknowledged that a stringent test of
causation is inconsistent with the aims and objectives of remedial
legislation. In this context, the "one factor" test holds considerable
promise in its flexibility and simplicity. This is especially true when
compared with the deficiencies of introducing adjectival uncertainty with
notions such as "important factor."
Another very important insight that is gained from a consideration of
causation in anti-discrimination law is that in that context, common law
courts have been clear and precise in treating as analytically distinct the
separate elements of causation and intent and ensuring that the two are
not conflated into a single test, even in the context of direct discrimina-
tion or disparate treatment. They have almost uniformly eschewed a
subjective analysis in favour of an outcomes based approach. This is not
to say that subjective concerns are not relevant, as in many cases they
will provide the requisite evidence of discrimination. However, the
courts"2 have been careful to reiterate that intent is not a necessary ele-
ment of the causation standard.
The potential relevance of flexible causation standards developed in
the anti-discrimination arena to the refugee context has been recognized
by two common law courts. In Chokov,30 3 a single justice of the Federal
Court of Australia referred to the "one factor" test provided in federal
anti-discrimination statutes as support for the proposition that a similarly
flexible test is appropriate in the context of the Refugee Convention, °4
and in Okere, another single justice of the Federal Court of Australia
cited a seminal decision on indirect discrimination in support of an ap-
proach to refugee determination that focuses on the impact or effect of a
persecutory policy in assessing nexus rather than on searching for the
302. Excluding the United States.
303. Chokov v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1999) FC.A. 823 (per
Einfeld, J.).
304. See id. para. 31. Justice Einfeld explained that two factors, one Convention related
and one non-Convention related, are
not competitive or mutually exclusive. In a given case they may both exist. The
normal legal result of such a finding would be an allowance of the claim. Indeed a
number of federal statutes operating in similar areas expressly provide for such a
result in those areas: s. 18 Racial Discrimination Act 1975, s.8 Sex Discrimination
Act 1984, s.10 Disability Discrimination Act 1992. Parliament has thus repeatedly
spoken on such issues of principle.
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motives of the persecutor."' In addition, in Gafoor, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied upon anti-discrimination
provisions in rejecting the dissent's view that persecution can only be
"on account of" a Convention ground if the factor, by itself, was suffi-
cient to bring about the action." In the latter case, after summarizing the
anti-discrimination standard set out in the federal Civil Rights Act of
1991-that is "that a person may act 'because of' a discriminatory factor
even though other factors also motivated the action, and even if the ac-
tion would have been taken in the absence of the discriminatory
factor"-the court noted that the dissent "offers no reason for imposing a
higher burden on asylum applicants than on employees in Title VII
cases."307 The court reasoned:
Indeed, the equities cut the other way. An employee at least has
the opportunity to gather evidence of the employer's motive and
to put the employer on the stand to explain the reasons behind
the employment action. The evidentiary obstacles for asylum
applicants, by contrast, are enormous. 'Persecutors,' we have
stated, 'are hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits
attesting to their acts of persecution.' Nor are they likely to sub-
mit declarations explaining exactly what motivated them to act.
And individuals fleeing persecution do not usually have the time
or ability to gather evidence of their persecutor's motives.08
Thus, the court concluded that it was unreasonable to require asylum
applicants to establish that the Convention explanation solely accounts
for the well-founded fear or even "to require a showing that the persecu-
tion would not have occurred in the absence of a protected ground," an
effective "but for" test. Rather, the reasonable approach was said to be to
adopt the "at least in part" test previously set out by the court in Borja. 9
In addition to the heightened evidentiary difficulties experienced by
refugee applicants, there is another powerful reason for understanding
that "the equities cut" in favor of the replication of liberal anti-
discrimination standards in the refugee context. That is, while anti-
discrimination legislation's primary purpose is to "redress perceived
injustices or disadvantages" and is thus "essentially remedial in
305. As mentioned above, Branson, J. in Okere v. Minister for Immigration & Multicul-
tural Affairs, (1998) 87 F.C.R. 112, 112 cites the decision of the High Court of Australia in
Australian Iron & Steel Proprietary Ltd. v. Banovic, (1989) 168 C.L.R. 165, 176-77, 184, in
support of her indirect or true reason test.
306. Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 653 (9th Cir. 2000).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 654.
309. Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d at 732 (9th Cir. 1999).
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character,' 310 it is nonetheless punitive in the sense that someone is held
responsible for the discriminatory conduct and punished (albeit in the
civil law) accordingly.3' As has been repeatedly emphasized in this
Article, the non-punitive nature of refugee law is a point of departure,
being concerned only with the protection of those who are potentially at
risk of persecution for a Convention reason. Thus, if a liberal causation
standard is appropriate in the context of a statutory scheme that
ultimately imposes liability, it should apply a fortiori in one that is
purely remedial.
III. A PROPOSED STANDARD OF CAUSATION
FOR THE NEXUS CLAUSE
In considering the correct interpretation of the Refugee Convention
it must be remembered that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties calls for the examination of a treaty term "in accordance with the
ordinary meaning" of its text construed in light of "its object and pur-
pose."' ' Consistent with this requirement, superior courts in the common
law world have reiterated that international instruments "should be inter-
preted in a more liberal manner than would be adopted if the court was
required to construe exclusively domestic legislation.'31 3
In the specific context of the Refugee Convention, it has been re-
peatedly emphasized that a "broad, liberal and purposive interpretation
must be given to the language, 314 since "those who framed the [Conven-
tion definition] wisely chose broad expressions, which it is not the
310. Evelyn Ellis, Gender Discrimination Law in the European Community, in Dis-
CRIMINATION LAW: CONCEPTS, LIMITATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 14-16 (Janet Dine & Bob
Watt eds., 1996).
311. Justice O'Connor in her opinion emphasizes that "Congress clearly conditioned le-
gal liability on a determination that the consideration of an illegitimate factor caused a
tangible employment injury of some kind." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265
(1989). The fact that such legislation ultimately imposed liability was also acknowledged by
the British Employment Appeal Tribunal in O'Neill v. Governors of St. Thomas More RCVA
Upper School, [1996] I.R.L.R. 372, 376 (Eng.) ("The question of causation has to be answered
in the context of a decision to attribute liability for the acts complained of.").
312. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 3, 1969, art.
31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
313. Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 C.L.R. 225,
255 (Austl.) (per McHugh, J.).
314. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Abdi, (1999) 162 A.L.R. 105,
115 (Austl.).
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Court's task to constrict."315 Moreover the "broad humanitarian purpose"
of the Convention has been recognized and reiterated in the case law.
3 6
In light of these prescriptions, there are a number of conclusions that
can be drawn from the analysis above. The first and most obvious one is
that any test that requires the protected ground to be the "sole cause" for
the fear of persecution must be rejected. Absolutely no basis exists for
such a test in the Convention text, nor is there any justification, based on
the aims and objectives of the Convention, for reading the word "sole"
into the Convention definition. Moreover, neither courts nor scholars
support such a test.
Second, if common law (tort) doctrines of causation are to be relied
upon, an approach which incorporates a policy/common sense notion
into the test itself should be strongly resisted primarily for the reason
that such a test offers little guidance to decisionmakers and produces
wide inconsistency, thus subjecting refugees to the possibility that simi-
larly situated claimants will be treated differently. Further, it is premised
on an underlying philosophy of limiting liability based on policy consid-
erations, a notion that has no role in refugee adjudication. To this end, it
should be emphasized that doctrines limiting legal liability such as novus
actus interveniens, unreasonable action or contributory negligence on the
part of plaintiffs, forseeability, and proximity have no place in refugee
determination.
Third, although the "but for" test has some advantages, it should be
rejected as unworkable. It is clear that in many cases the "but for" test
can present a convenient shorthand method of displaying that a person's
predicament is "for reasons of" a convention ground. Moreover, it help-
fully denotes that the proper inquiry is an objective as opposed to a
subjective one. However, the problems with the test suggest that it would
require significant modification in the refugee context, particularly in
relation to multiple cause cases. In addition, it produces a great deal of
confusion in refugee case law, and also involves the danger that its link
315. Ram v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, (1995) 57 F.C.R. 565, 568 (per
Burchett, J. with whom O'Loughlin & R.D. Nicholson, JJ. agreed). See Brief Amicus Curiae
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Support of Respon-
dent at 8 n. 11, Elias-Zacarias (No. 90-1342) (In discussion formulating the Convention, one
delegate urged that "what had so far been accomplished.., be reconsidered in a more gener-
ous spirit' that the terms be "truly liberal" and that the "definition of refugee to be adopted
... be as all-embracing as possible." A statement by one of the drafters of the Convention
confirms that the definition was meant to be interpreted expansively: "The drafters did not
have specific restrictions in mind when they used this terminology. Theirs was an effort to
express in legal terms what is generally considered as a... refugee." (citations omitted)).
316. See R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec'y of State for
the Home Dep't, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 646, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015, [1995] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L.
1999) (per Steyn, L.J.); id. at 649 (per Hoffman, L.J.); Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigra-
tion & Multicultural Affairs, (2000) 201 C.L.R. 293, 307 (per Kirby, J.).
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with tort law will encourage other tort-based concepts to be introduced
inappropriately into refugee determination.
The insight which emerges from an analysis of anti-discrimination
law and equity is that where the law is concerned with providing protec-
tion for vulnerable persons and is focused more closely on the provision
of remedies rather than the allocation of legal responsibility (as is the
case in refugee law), courts and legislatures have been amenable to the
application of a more liberal and flexible understanding of causation and
indeed have considered that such an approach is necessary to uphold the
objectives of the law in those areas.
In the context of the Refugee Convention, it has been recognized that
a "distant nexus" standard, manifested as the question whether the well-
founded fear of being persecuted is "in part" due to a Convention
ground, is necessary in order to accommodate the evidentiary challenges
inherent in the determination, and to accord full effect to the aims and
purposes of the Convention. The difficulties imposed on applicants by
the adoption of a more stringent test that requires the Convention ground
to be a "sufficient" or "necessary" cause of the well-founded fear have
been acknowledged in the case law, even by those judges who
nonetheless prefer the higher standard. In the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth circuit in Gafoor, discussed above,
the dissenting judge accepted that a test that requires the applicant to
prove that "he would have been treated ... differently" but for the
Convention ground, "is not easily satisfied"'317 and that attempting to
separate situational factors as precisely as a strict causation test would
demand "requires a degree of inferential hair-splitting" that the court had
not previously been willing to attempt.38 Indeed, an analysis of existing
cases reveals the artificiality that would be involved in an attempt to
accord different weight to different explanations for a person's well-
founded fear of being persecuted. In none of the refugee cases reviewed
for the purposes of this Article, involving multiple causes, was a court
able to ascertain the degree of significance of a certain factor, other than
to recognize that it played "a part" in the fear of future persecution.
Rather, it is acknowledged that in many cases Convention factors are
"inextricably linked" to non-Convention grounds.3"9 In light of these
observations, any test that required an asylum applicant to establish that
the Convention ground was the "essential", "substantial," or "central"
317. Gafoor v. INS, 231 F3d 645, 661 (9th Cir. 2000).
318. Id.
319. See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Sarrazola, (2001) 107
F.C.R. 184, 199 (Austl.) (per Heerey, J.). Similarly, in Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1029 (2nd
Cir. 1994), Judge Oakes of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit admitted
that "[a]ny attempt to unravel economic from political motives is untenable in this case."
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reason for the well-founded fear, could potentially exclude a very
significant number of applicants who have nonetheless demonstrated that
they have a well-founded fear for a Convention ground. As the UNHCR
has recently explained, "[t]here is no requirement in the Convention,
Protocol, Handbook or Executive Committee documents that one of the
protected grounds be central to the persecutor's motivation.,3" Therefore
a very strong argument can be made that a less stringent "one factor" or
"in part" test is required by a proper reading of the Convention text, in
light of its object and purpose.
Moreover, this is not merely a preferable policy perspective but is
arguably required by the Convention text in light of the accepted under-
standings of the degree of certainty that must be established in refugee
determination more generally. It is very well established that the stan-
dard set out in the Convention text, "well-founded fear," is satisfied
pursuant to evidence of a less than probable chance of being persecuted.
The test has variously been described as requiring a "reasonable possi-
bility,"32' "reasonable degree of likelihood ' '322 "reasonable chance,, 323 and
"real chance. 324 Reading the Convention definition as a whole, it is ap-
parent that an analysis that requires an applicant to establish the precise
causal role played by a Convention ground is inconsistent with a proper
application of the "well founded fear" test in that it requires a degree of
certainty that travels well beyond the "likelihood" standard specified in
the text.325 Judges have warned of the danger in considering each of the
320. Comments on Proposed Rule Regarding Asylum and Withholding Definitions of the
UNHCR, Regional Office for the United States of America and the Caribbean, INS No. 2092-
00, AG Order No. 2339-2000, at 7 (Jan. 22, 2001) (on file with author).
321. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 467 U.S. 407 (1987).
322. R. v. Sec'y for State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Sivakumaran, I All E.R. 193,
197-98 (1988) (Eng.).
323. Adjei v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, 7 Imm. L.R.2d 169, 172-73
(F.C.A. 1989) (Austl.), cited in HATHAWAY, supra note 37, at 79.
324. Chan v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, (1989) 169 C.L.R. 379, 389
(Austl.) (per Mason, C.J.).
325. This is well explained in a
number of dissenting judgments of the United States Board of Immigration Appeals. For
example, Board Member Rosenberg explained in dissent:
There is no statute, regulation, or other authority that requires that a persecutor
must seek to harm his victim solely, principally, or probably on account of the of-
fending characteristic. To the contrary, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987), recognized that evidence of less than a probability of persecution is suffi-
cient to satisfy the well-founded fear standard. The Supreme Court went on to state
that even a 10 percent chance that the victim will be killed, tortured, or otherwise
persecuted should be sufficient to satisfy the applicable reasonable fear standard. In
other words, even a less than probable chance of persecution resulting from a desire
to overcome a racial or family-based characteristic will support a finding than an
asylum seeker has a well-founded fear.
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elements in the definition as separate and distinct, 326 a warning arguably
justified by the many cases that seek to ascertain the precise role that the
Convention ground plays by reference to a causation standard divorced
from the remainder of the definitional requirements.
It is in light of these considerations that the Michigan Guidelines 7
recommend that, in view of the unique objects and purposes of refugee
status determination, and taking account of the practical challenges of
refugee status determination, the Convention ground need not be shown
to be the sole, or even the dominant, cause of the risk of being
persecuted. It need only be a contributing factor to the risk of being
persecuted. A Convention ground will be a contributing cause if its
presence increases the risk of being persecuted.
A focus on the interpretation of the definition as a whole also
highlights the fact that the relevant nexus or connection is between the
well-founded fear of being persecuted and the Convention reason, which
uses the passive voice to suggest a predicament-based approach. The
precise definition refers to persons who are unable or unwilling to avail
themselves of the protection of their country "owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted" for Convention reasons. This clearly focuses an
adjudicator on the reasons for the person's well-founded fear of being
persecuted and not on the personal motivations of potential persecutors.
While these two inquiries may be co-extensive in some cases, they may
not and need not be so in all cases. Indeed, the imposition of
persecutorial intent as a necessary element in a refugee claim imposes a
limitation not found in the Convention text. For this reason, the
Guidelines phrase the test as one of "contributing cause" rather than, for
example, "motivating cause."
In re V-T-S, B.I.A. Interim Dec. 3008, 16 (Mar. 6, 1997). See also id. at 12 (Chairman Schmidt
dissenting); In re C-A-L, B.I.A. Interim Dec. 3305, 7 (Feb. 21, 1997) (Chairman Schmidt
dissenting); id. at 10-13 (Board Member Rosenberg dissenting). This point is also emphasized
in the context of the proposed amendment to the INS regulations, discussed supra notes 84-
88, that would require an applicant to establish that the protected ground was "central" to the
persecutor's motive. As the submission argues, the wording that, in mixed motivation cases,
the applicant
must establish that a protected characteristic was central to the persecutor's motiva-
tion, strongly implies that the applicant must establish the persecutor's motivation
to a virtual certainty. This imposes a standard of proof far higher, and entirely in-
consistent with, the well-founded fear standard, as defined by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the U.N. Convention relating to the status of refugees, and other state parties
and international authorities interpreting that standard.
Harvard Immigration Memo, supra note 86, at 8.
326. See Gersten v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (2000) FC.A. 855
(Austi.).
327. James C. Hathaway, Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 207 para. 13 (2002).
[Vol. 23:265
Winter 2002] Causation in Context 339
Returning again to the meaning of "well-founded," it is clear that,
while positing a reasonably low standard of certainty, it nonetheless re-
quires some objective basis. For example, in seeking to give content to
phrases such as "real chance," courts have explained that there must be
more than a "remote or insubstantial" '328 risk and that there must be "a
substantial, as distinct from a remote chance" of the well-founded fear.329
Accordingly, the Michigan Guidelines acknowledge that there may be
cases where the Convention ground is so tenuously linked to the well-
founded fear that the fear can no longer be characterized as "for reasons
of" a Convention ground. Therefore, the "contributing cause" standard is
modified by the principle that if the Convention ground is remote to the
point of irrelevance, refugee status need not be recognized.
Finally, it is important to emphasize the necessity for courts and de-
cisionmakers actually to apply the liberal standard warranted by a proper
interpretation of the Convention text. As was made clear above, whilst
purporting to reject a sole standard test and thus admit of the possibility
of multiple reasons, courts and tribunals nonetheless are prone to dis-
missing claims by negating the relevance of a Convention ground once a
non-Convention factor is identified. This was recognized by the Full
Federal Court of Australia in Sarrazola,33 ° in which Merkel, J. explained
that "[t]o elevate having the means to pay to be the only reason motivat-
ing the respondent's persecutors is, bearing in mind 'the broad policy of
the Convention ... illogical and wrong.' ,331 The Court went on to say
that the tribunal below "cannot immunize itself from review by correctly
stating the tests to be applied in order to determine whether the causal
nexus requirements of Art 1(2A) are satisfied. It must correctly apply the
tests"33 2 A similar observation might be made about cases involving
claims by women who allege a well-founded fear of being persecuted in
the context of domestic violence and other gender-specific claims
wherein courts and tribunals have fallen into error in isolating the sup-
posedly "private and personal nature" of the threat of harm from the
wider (and vital) context of societal discrimination and/or withholding of
protection by the state on discriminatory grounds.333
328. Chan v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, (1989) 169 C.L.R. 379, 407
(Austl.) (per Toohey, J.).
329. Id. at 379 (per Mason, C.J.).
330. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Sarrazola, (2001) 107 EC.R.
184 (Austl.).
331. Id. at 199 (citations omitted).
332. Id.
333. See, for example, the decision of the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) in
Khawar v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, discussed by the Federal Court in
Khawar v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1999) 168 A.L.R. 190, 192-93.
The RRT's decision was overturned by the Federal Court, id., and the Minister's appeal to the
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CONCLUSION
The analysis undertaken in this Article has revealed that the
treatment of the nexus issue by common law courts and tribunals is often
complex and overly complicated, and not always undertaken with a clear
sense of the aims and objectives of refugee law or with the key
challenges of refugee determination in mind. Notwithstanding this, some
courts have recognized the difficulties inherent in the nexus question and
have thus begun to develop a straightforward and liberal standard of
causation, requiring only that the protected ground constitute a
contributing cause or partial reason for the well-founded fear of
persecution.
A consideration of approaches to causation determination in other
areas of law augments the necessity for, and legitimacy of, such an
approach, since it reveals that courts have displayed a willingness to
respond to the policy implications and practical requirements of causal
determination in fields such as equity and anti-discrimination law by
developing similarly straightforward and liberal standards of causation.
In light of the insights obtained from the analysis undertaken in this
Article and taking into account the humanitarian objectives of the Refu-
gee Convention, it is concluded that the most appropriate approach to
nexus determination is an objective one that asks whether the Conven-
tion ground is a contributing cause of the applicant's well-founded fear
of being persecuted. Such an approach appears to constitute the most
appropriate method of fulfilling the aims and objectives of the Conven-
tion and of ensuring its contemporary relevance.
Full Federal Court was unsuccessful, Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v.
Khawar, (2001) 178 A.L.R. 120. The Minister has been granted special leave to appeal to the
High Court. However, the Court's decision had not been handed down at the date of publica-
tion.
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